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ALEXANDER V. SANDOVAL: WHY A SUPREME 
COURT CASE ABOUT DRIVER'S liCENSES 
MATTERS TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
ADVOCATES 
LISA S. CORE* 
Abstract: Environmental justice litigants have used federal courts to 
challenge actions on the part of federal fund recipients that have a 
disparate impact, regardless of intent. In the environmental justice 
context, it is nearly impossible to provide evidence of discriminatory 
intent. Unfortunately, the federal courts have all but eliminated a 
private right of action to enforce violations of federal agency regulations 
enacted pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibit 
such an impact. It is plain that the courts will not imply a private right of 
action to enforce these regulations. The question remains whether 
litigants may use an alternative enforcement mechanism, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, to sue for violations of their Title VI rights. The answer is not 
simple because the purported rights are regulatory, and the current 
Supreme Court has made clear that evidence of congressional intent is 
required. 
Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races 
contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, sub-
sidizes or results in racial discrimination.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Minority communities bear a disproportionately high burden of 
environmental hazards and are disproportionately denied environ-
mental benefits.2 Environmental justice aims to attack and eradicate 
* Solicitations Editor, BoSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REVIEW, 2002-
03. 
1 PresidentJohn F. Kennedy, Message to Congress, H.R. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.CAN. 1534. President Kennedy'S message promoted 
environmental justice long before it became popular. 
2 Poor people and people of color encounter environmental hazards in their work-
place, homes, and communities. See Robert D. Bullard, Overview and Legacy of Early Strug-
gles, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND CoMMUNmES OF CoLOR 19 
(Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994). Exposure to these environmental burdens has a deleterious 
impact on health. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAzARDOUS AND NON-HAZARDOUS 
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192 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 30:191 
this disparity by injecting equity considerations into environmental 
enforcement, compliance, policy formation, and decision-making.3 
The equitable allocation of resources is necessary "to insure that the 
uses people make of the environment are compatible with one an-
other, and with the environment's continued habitability."4 Environ-
mental justice focuses on the quality of life of present generations, as 
well as the condition of the environment for future generations.5 
Environmental justice plaintiffs first brought claims to federal 
court that alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.6 These claims met with little success-be-
cause plaintiffs could not prove discriminatory intent-and so plain-
tiffs searched for a new vehicle for their challenges.7 They found Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 Simply put, Title VI governs the 
conduct of recipients of federal funds.9 Federal agencies that adminis-
ter these funds have promulgated regulations that proscribe conduct 
that has a discriminatory impact.10 Until recently, every federal court 
to consider the question has allowed individuals to sue for violations 
of Title VI and its regulations by implying a private right of action, and 
W ASTE- DEMOGRAPHICS OF PEOPLE LMNG NEAR WASTE FACIUTIES 95-84 (1995), available 
in Westlaw, 1995 WL 522715. For example, blacks have a significantly higher prevalence of 
asthma than the general population, and black children are more likely to have unsafe 
levels of lead in their blood than white children. See PRESIDENT'S TASKFORCE ON ENVNTL. 
HEALTH RISKS & SAFETY RISKS TO CHILDREN, ELIMINATING CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING: 
A FEDERAL STRATEGY TARGETING LEAD PAINT HAZARDS 2 (2000), available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/children/whatwe/leadhaz.pdf (Last visited Oct. 2, 2002). The EPA's Office 
of Children's Health Protection reports, as a "childhood asthma fact, " that "asthma-related 
hospitalizations have risen disproportionately for inner-city children, and in particular for 
minority populations." U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF CHILDREN'S HEALTH PROT., 
EPA's CHILDREN'S ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH YEARBOOK 12 (1998). 
3 See Bullard, supra note 2, at 11. The Environmental Protection Agency's Environ-
mental Justice Program suggests that "environmental justice is achieved when everyone, 
regardless of race, culture, or income enjoys the same degree of protection from environ-
mental and health hazards and equal access to the decision making process to have a 
healthy environment in which to live, work and learn." EPA Environmental Justice Pro-
gram Website, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/index.html (Last 
visited Oct. 2, 2002). 
4 PETER S. WENZ, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 19 (1988). Wenz suggests that as environ-
mental problems increase, our social fabric will be compromised unless people can be 
assured that "they are receiving their fair share of benefits and are not being required 
unfairly to shoulder great burdens." Id at 21. 
5 See id. 
6 See infra Part 1.A. 
7 See infra Part LA. 
S See infra Part LB. 
9 See infra Part II.B. 
10 See infra Part LB. 
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had only required that plaintiffs prove a disparate impact.ll The Su-
preme Court recently foreclosed this avenue, however, when it held 
that there is no private right of action to enforce the Title VI's dispa-
rate-impact regulations in Alexander v. Sandoval.12 
Because plaintiffs no longer e~oy an implied private right of ac-
tion to enforce the disparate-impact regulations of Title VI, the search 
is on for another enforcement mechanism. Relief may be provided by 
42 u.s.c. § 1983.13 While the federal circuit courts, prior to Sandoval, 
uniformly implied a private right of action under Title VI, they have 
taken different approaches under § 1983 and have arrived at 
conflicting answers.14 Recently, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
a Third Circuit case that held the Title VI regulations could not be 
enforced through § 1983. This denial could be interpreted as an 
affirmation of the Third Circuit's position. Alternatively, as the federal 
circuit courts remain split on the issue, it is possible that the Supreme 
Court is simply waiting for a better opportunity to answer the ques-
tion. This Note will examine the viability of 42 u.s.c. § 1983 as an en-
forcement mechanism for violations of Title VI in the post-Sandoval 
era. 
Part I of this Note will discuss the legal strategies that environ-
mental justice litigants have used, including constitutional claims and 
actions based on Title VI claims. Part I will also review the mecha-
nisms litigants have employed to bring their claims for discrimination 
under Title VI, specifically, the implied private right of action and 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. Part II will focus on the Supreme Court decision in 
Sandoval and its impact on environmental justice plaintiffs. Part III 
will attempt to answer what remains for environmental justice litigants 
in Sandovafs wake: May they still enforce Title VI through 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983? 
I. THE LEGAL STRATEGIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE LITIGANTS 
Prior to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Alexander v. 
Sandoval, environmental justice plaintiffs had a number of legal tools 
with which to wage their battles, including common law tort claims, 
federal and state environmental statutes, constitutional challenges, 
and civil rights statutes, such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
11 See infra Part I1A. 
12 See infra Part IlIA. 
U See infra Part I1.B.2. 
14 See infra Part I1I.B.2.h. 
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1964}5 Largely dependent on the plaintiffs burden at trial, some 
strategies have been more effective than others. The following sec-
tions will compare using the Constitution and Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to combat environmental discrimination in court. 
A. The Burden of Proving Intent Under the Equal Protection Doctrine 
Most early environmental justice cases alleged a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.16 The Equal 
Protection Clause provides that "no state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal 
protection of the laws. "17 The historical failure of these constitution-
ally based actions stems from the requirement that plaintiffs prove 
that discriminatory intent motivated the challenged conduct}S Even 
when disparate impact is evident, it is nearly impossible for plaintiffs 
15 See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Environmentaljustice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling, 
21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 523, 538-39 (1994) (providing a hierarchy for environmental jus-
tice litigation strategies) ; Julia B. Latham Worsham, Dipsarate Impact Lawsuits Under Title VI, 
Section 602: Can A Legal Tool Build EnvironmentaIJustice?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 631, 
638 (2000). 
16 These complaints often challenge the decision to locate undesirable facilities in mi-
nority communities. See, e.g., R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991) (com-
munity group alleged local government's decision to site a regional landfill in a predomi-
nantly black community violated their equal protection rights), aff'd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 
1992) (table decision); E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Plan-
ning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (plaintiffs challenged decision 
of local planning and zoning commission to allow a private landfill in a predominantly 
minority community), aff'd, 888 F.2d 573 (llth Cir. 1989), op. amended & superseded on 
denial ofreh'g by 896 F.2d 1264, 1266 (llth Cir. 1989) (agreeing with district court's conclu-
sion that the challenged decision was without racial animus); Bean v. Southwestern Waste 
Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (plaintiffs challenged the Texas Depart-
ment of Health's decision to grant an operation permit for a solid waste facility in a pre-
dominantly minority community); see also Cole, supra note 15, at 538-39; James H. Colopy, 
The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,13 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 125, 145 (1994). 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XN, § 1. 
18 See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 617 (1983) (asserting 
that the Equal Protection Clause has been held to only prohibit intentional discrimina-
tion); Village of Arlington Heights V. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 
(1977); Washington V. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (stating that disproportionate im-
pact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of invidious racial discrimination); 
see also Colopy, supra note 16, at 151 (stating that the intent requirement has been a major 
stumbling block for environmental justice plaintiffs seeking relief under the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Richard]. Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentaIJustice": The Distributional Effects 
of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787,828 (1993) (suggesting that the equal 
protection doctrine has not been hospitable to environmental justice claims). 
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to prove discriminatory intent.19 The one exception to this rule has 
been municipal services cases, where plaintiffs have successfully dem-
onstrated that their cities or towns provide services in a racially or 
ethnically discriminatory manner.20 
To determine whether discriminatory intent is present, the court 
must engage in a "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct 
evidence as may be available. "21 Evidence may include: (l) the impact 
of the action; (2) the historical background of the decision; (3) the 
specific sequence of events leading to the challenged action; (4) any 
departure from normal decision-making processes; and (5) the legis-
lative or administrative history of the decision.22 By requiring plain-
tiffs to prove intentional discrimination, the courts have created a 
nearly insurmountable obstacle because "[m] odern-day institutional 
racism in the United States is rarely so apparent that it will be seen in 
19 See Cole, supra note 15, at 538; Latham Worsham, supra note 15, at 641. See generally 
Terry Props., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1986); RI S.E. , 768 F. 
Supp. 1144; E. Bibb Twiggs, 706 F. Supp. 880; Bean, 482 F. Supp. 673. The one exception to 
this rule has been municipal services cases, where plaintiffs have successfully demonstrated 
that their cities or towns provide services in a racially or ethnically discriminatory manner. 
See generally, e.g., Miller v. City of Dallas, NO. CIV.A.3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 WL 230834 (N.D. 
Tex. Feb. 14, 2002). 
20 See generally Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986); Dowdell v. City of 
Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1983); Miller, 2002 WL 230834; Baker v. City of 
Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986). It is not easy to explain why the courts treat 
these two categories of cases differently. They share common threads of environmental 
discrimination, and the effects are substantially the same: minority communities are left in 
an inferior position either by being required to shoulder burdens or by being denied 
benefits. See Lazarus, supra note 18, at 833. One explanation might be that it is easier to 
establish a pattern of discrimination in municipal services cases because of the evidentiary 
record of municipal decision-making, or that courts may be more willing to require mu-
nicipalities to provide additional services and be less willing to shift the burden to another 
community by rejecting a siting decision. See Colopy, supra note 16, at 150. In rare circum-
stances, a "stark" pattern of discriminatory impact-that is unexplainable on grounds 
other than race-may be determinative of discriminatory intent. See Arlington Heights, 429 
U.S. at 266. See generally Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that disparate impact itself sufficient to prove invidious dis-
crimination); Ammons, 783 F.2d 982 (finding that based on the size of the disparity and the 
nature of the practices, the impact alone gives rise to an inference of discriminatory in-
tent); Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394, 410 (1991) 
(noting that where the pattern of discrimination is particularly "invidious" the Supreme 
Court has found discriminatory purpose from pattern alone). Municipal services cases 
demonstrate how conspicuous official action must be before courts will infer discrimina-
tory purpose. 
21 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
22 See id. at 266-68. The Supreme Court noted that these factors are not exhaustive. [d. 
at 268. 
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the records of hearings and deliberations of a government body. "23 
When environmental discrimination is commonly "traceable to the 
self perpetuating vestiges of past discrimination, the equal protection 
test simply cannot be met. "24 The intent requirement disregards the 
pattern and pervasiveness of institutional racism in this country.25 
The problem is particularly acute for environmental justice plain-
tiffs because of the nature of environmental discrimination and deg-
radation.26 Environmental justice concerns commonly arise when a 
community suffers from adverse effects created by multiple pollution 
sources.27 The cumulative nature of these adverse environmental im-
pacts makes it difficult to prove intent on the part of any single ac-
tor. 28 
B. An Answer to the Intent Obstacle: Title V7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
A litigation strategy that only requires proof of discriminatory 
impact rather than discriminatory intent reduces an environmental 
justice plaintiffs burden.29 Intent is not an element of the disparate 
impact test. 30 To establish a prima facie case of adverse disparate im-
23 Colopy, supra note 16, at 151. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 622 (Marshall,]., dissenting) 
(an effects-based test is more practical than a test that focuses on the intent of the Title VI 
fund recipient because motive is difficult to determine). 
24 Lazarus, supra note 18, at 830-31. Apparently neutral criteria, such as land cost and 
residential density, commonly serve to justify locating "environmental harms" in minority 
communities; this makes it difficult to prove intent and easy to defend a decision that has a 
discriminatory effect. See Colopy, supra note 16, at 150. 
25 Colopy, supra note 16, at 151. Colopy argues that requiring proof of discriminatory 
intent quietly suggests that conscious racism is blameworthy but unconscious racism is not, 
regardless of effect. [d. 
26 Cole, supra note 15, at 538-39. In fact, civil rights lawyers have characterized envi-
ronmentaljustice cases employing equal protection claims as "certain losers." [d. 
27 See Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering Environ-
mental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft Revised Guidance for 
Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (Draft Revised hives-
tigation Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650, 39,653 (June 27, 2000) [hereinafter EPA Title VI 
Guidance]. 
28 Environmental degradation follows a self-fulfilling prophecy. The presence of unde-
sirable facilities-landfills, heavy industry, and poorly maintained infrastructure--nega-
tively affects property values. As property becomes less expensive, it becomes more atU'ac-
tive from a development perspective. The trend continues until communities are densely 
populated and overburdened by undesirable facilities. See Lazarus, supra note 18, at 831 (a 
community may become a minority community only after a hazardous waste facility is lo-
cated there because of the decrease in property values caused by the siting). 
29 See Cole, supra note 15, at 540-41; Latham Worsham, supra note 15, at 642-43; Laza-
rus, supra note 18, at 835. 
30 See, e.g., Llamas v. Butte Cmty. ColI. Dist., 238 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001); Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1278 (11th Cir. 
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pact, a plaintiff must allege a causal connection between a facially 
neutral policy and a disproportionate and adverse impact on minori-
ties.31 Once this showing has been made, the burden shifts to the de-
fendant to demonstrate the existence of "a substantial legitimate 
justification" for the allegedly discriminatory practice.32 If the defen-
dant meets this burden, the plaintiff may still prove her case by dem-
onstrating that other less discriminatory means would serve the same 
objective, or that the defendant's explanation is pretext.33 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI) was once 
thought to provide an answer to the discriminatory intent obstacle of 
the Constitution, and relieve the plaintiff of her burden of proving 
intent.34 Title VI forbids discrimination by programs receiving federal 
financial assistance, and it applies when federal funding is given to an 
intermediate, non-federal entity that distributes funding to 
beneficiaries.35 Section 601 of Title VI states that "[nlo person in the 
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance."36 Under section 602, federal agencies 
2000); N.Y City Envtl.Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2000); N.Y Ur-
ban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995). 
~l E.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 393 (3d. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1046 
(1999); Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1036. 
~2 E.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 624 n.15 (1983); Urban 
League, 71 F.3d at 1036; Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP V. Georgia, 775 F.2d 
1403,1417 (llthCir.1985). 
33 E.g., Guardians, 463 U.S. at 624 n.15; Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1036; Branches of 
NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1417; see Michael D. Mattheison, Applying the Disparate Impact Rule of 
Law to Environmental Permitting Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 24 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L & POL'y REv. 1, 12-13 (2000) (describing the elements of the disparate impact 
test). 
~4See Lazarus, supra note 18, at 839 (by using Title VI as a vehicle for environmental 
justice suits "the bugaboo of proving discriminatory intent can be avoided"). In Griggs V. 
Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court emphasized that "Congress directed the thrust of the 
[Civil Rights] Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motiva-
tion." 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Although Griggs addressed discrimination in the Title VII 
employment context, courts deciding Title VI disparate impact cases have looked to Title 
VII cases for guidance. See, e.g., Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1036; Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d 
at 1417; Larry P. V. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 nn.9 & 10 (9th Cir. 1984). 
~5 Colopy, supra note 16, at 154. A typical intermediary grant recipient is a state agency 
that provides funding to a wide range of beneficiaries, including individuals, local or state 
governments, nonprofit organizations, and private industry. See Cole, supra note 15, at 531. 
Most Title VI environmental justice suits are brought against a state agency; in 1986 Con-
gress prohibited states from invoking Eleventh Amendment immunity to escape Title VI 
liability. See Colopy, supra note 16, at 156 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988)). 
36 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
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that make grants may promulgate regulations that prohibit recipients 
from engaging in activities that cause discriminatory effects.37 Section 
602 provides: 
Each federal department and agency which is empowered to 
extend Federal financial assistance to programs or activity 
... is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of 
[section 601] ... by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of 
general applicability which shall be consistent with achieve-
ment of the objectives of the statute. "38 
Approximately forty federal agencies have created regulations 
pursuant to section 602's directive.39 The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) is one such agency.40 EPA awards grants on an annual 
basis to many state and local agencies that administer environmental 
programs under EPA's authority. As directed by Title VI, EPA's sec-
tion 602 regulations prohibit recipients-including state agencies 
granting environmental permits-from engaging in practices that 
create discriminatory effects.41 This Note will focus on EPA's sec-
tion 602 regulations because of its broad oversight of environmental 
programs, permitting activities, and public commitment to environ-
mental justice. 42 
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. 
sa [d. 
39 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 619 (1983) (Marshall,]., dis-
senting); Powell V. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 393 (3d Cir. 1999), cm. denied, 528 U.S. 1046 
(1999). The Deparunent of Justice coordinates and reviews the proposed regulations of all 
federal agencies and is required to ensure that each agency enforces its regulations. In 
1994, Attorney GeneralJanet Reno issued a memorandum regarding the use of the dispa-
rate impact standard in administrative regulations under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. 
Memorandum from Attorney GeneralJanet Reno, to Heads of Deparunents and Agencies 
That Provide Federal Financial Assistance (July 14, 1994) (on file with author). She com-
mitted the Clinton Administration to "vigorously" enforcing Title VI, and asked that each 
agency head "ensure that the disparate impact provisions in your regulations are fully util-
ized so that all persons may enjoy equally the benefits of federally financed programs." [d. 
40 EPA's Title VI regulations are codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 7 (2001). 
41 40 C.F.R. § 7.30 reads, in part: "No person shall be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving EPA assistance on the basis of race, color, [or] national origin .... " The EPA 
Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is responsible for administering and developing EPA's com-
pliance program under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 40 C.F.R. § 7.20. 
42 Although the current administration has been criticized for its environmental pol-
icy, EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whiunan has affirmed the EPA's commiunent to 
environmental justice. Memorandum from Christine Todd Whiunan, EPA Administrator, 
to EPA personnel (Aug. 9, 2001) (on file with author). 
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EPA regulations prohibit grant recipients from engaging in activi-
ties that have a discriminatory effect, regardless of intent.43 The regula-
tions state: 
A recipient shall not choose a site or location of a facility 
that has the purpose or effect of excluding individuals from, 
denying them the benefits of, or subjecting them to dis-
crimination under any program to which this part applies on 
the grounds of race, color, or national origin or sex.44 
Further, a fund recipient shall not "[p]rovide a person any service, aid 
or other benefit that is different, or is provided differently from that 
provided to others under the program. "45 Because discriminatory in-
tent is so difficult to prove, EPA's disparate-impact regulations had 
been considered "the most accessible, most effective tool in the envi-
ronmental justice tool chest."46 
II. METHODS OF ENFORCING VIOLATIONS OF TITLE VI 
Enforcement of EPA's regulations is of particular interest to indi-
viduals who must live with the effects of EPA's permitting decisions. 
The regulations enable citizens to file administrative complaints with 
EPA's Office of Civil Rights. 47 EPA has the authority to "terminate or 
refuse to award or to continue assistance" to recipients of federal 
funds for non-compliance.48 Unfortunately, EPA has been criticized 
for taking a narrow view of its responsibilities and being slow to en-
force its obligations under Title VI.49 Although EPA has received many 
45 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35. 
44 Id. § 7.35(c) (emphasis added). 
45Id. § 7.35(a) (2). 
46 Jimmy White, Environmental justice: Is Disparate Impact Enough?, 50 MERCER L. REv. 
1155,1183 (1999). 
47 40 C.F.R. § 7.120 (2001). The regulations state that "a person who believes that he 
or she or a specific class of persons has been discriminated against in violation of this part 
may file a complaint." Id. Guidelines are provided for investigating all complaints. Id. Mter 
receiving the complaint, OCR conducts a preliminary investigation, and thereafter may 
accept, reject, or refer the complaint to the appropriate federal agency. See id. 
48 Id. § 7.125. Recipients may regain eligibility after their assistance has been denied, 
terminated, or suspended. See id. § 7.135. Neither filing nor acceptance of a Title VI com-
plaint for investigation suspends an issued permit. See EPA Title VI Guidance, supra note 
27, at 39,651. 
49 See White, supra note 46, at 1168. EPA effectively avoided enforcing Title VI from the 
early 1970s until 1993, when the Clinton Administration committed EPA to meeting its 
responsibilities. Bradford C. Mank, Is There A Private Cause of Action Under EPA's Title VI 
Regulations?: The Need To Empower Environmental justice Plaintijft, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 
17-18 (l999)[hereinafter Private Cause of Action]. 
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administrative complaints,50 it has issued only one substantive deci-
sion.51 EPA's slow response suggests that environmental justice plain-
tiffs need an alternative forum to air their grievances and challenge 
discriminatory actions themselves. Environmental justice advocates 
have brought these challenges directly to federal court through two 
different enforcement mechanisms: first, by asking courts to imply a 
private right of action under Title VI, and second, by using 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 to challenge state actors for depriving plaintiffs of their Title 
VI "rights. "52 
A. An Implied Private Right of Action Under Title VI 
Private citizens ordinarily cannot sue for a statutory violation in 
federal court unless Congress has manifested its intent to provide for 
a private right of action.5! Congress did not explicitly provide for a 
private right of action under Title VI.54 However, in cases involving 
implied rights of action, the federal courts are asked to supplement 
the remedies created by Congress for the enforcement of federal 
regulatory statutes.55 These cases typically arise where Congress has 
created an administrative agency with specified enforcement powers 
but has not explicitly authorized individuals who claim injuries from 
50 The OCR maintains and regularly updates a database of all the Title VI complaints 
that have been filed with EPA The database provides basic information about each com-
plaint-such as the EPA program involved, the parties, the challenged action, and the 
status of the complaint. See List of Title VI Complaints Filed with EPA, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/t6complnt.htm (Last visited Oct. 7 2002). 
51 St. Francis Prayer Ctr. v. Mich. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, EPA File No 5R-98-R5 (Select 
Steel Complaint) (Oct. 30,1998). After concluding its investigation, EPA found no Title VI 
or regulatory violations. A copy of the decision memorandum and investigative report for 
the Select Steel Complaint are available at http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/ssdec_ir. 
pdf (Last visited Oct. 7, 2002). 
52 See infra Parts IIA & B. 
53 E.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 732-34 (1979) (Powell, j., dissenting) 
(reviewing history of Supreme Court decisions implying or prohibiting a private right of 
action). 
54 See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 597 (1983) (stating that the 
private cause of action under Title VI is implied by the judiciary rather than expressly cre-
ated by Congress). 
55 JOHN C. JEFFRIES ET AL., CML RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 283 
(2000). See, e.g., Alexander V. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001); Transamerica Mortgage 
Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) V. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979). In Sandova~ the Supreme Court 
stated that statutory intent is determinative. 532 U.S. at 286; see also Va. Bankshares, Inc. V. 
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 
804,812 n.9 (1986). Without proof of intent, "a cause of action does not exist and courts 
may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how com-
patible with the statute." Sandov~ 532 U.S. at 286-87. 
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violations of the regulatory standards to sue for damages or equitable 
relief. 56 This is the case for individuals alleging violations of Title VI or 
its regulations-such as environmental justice plaintiffs who claim to 
have been injured by violations of Title VI regulations. 
Until recently, environmental justice plaintiffs-relying on the 
courts and on EPA's guidance57-used section 602 of Title VI to bring 
actions to enjoin activities with a discriminatory impact. 58 Generally, 
courts are reluctant to create a judicial remedy were Congress has not. 
Nevertheless, federal courts overwhelmingly implied a private right of 
action to enforce section 602 before the Alexander v. Sandoval deci-
sion.59 The following sections will examine the test that courts used to 
imply a private right of action to enforce Title VI before Sandoval. 
1. The Supreme Court's Emphasis on Congressional Intent 
In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court adopted a four-factor test-
which has been used in a variety of contexts beyond Title VI-to deter-
mine when it is appropriate to imply a private right of action.60 First; 
the statute must have been meant to benefit the plaintiff.61 Second, 
56 JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 55, at 283. 
57 EPA Title VI Guidance, supra note 27. 
58 Laura Lynn Tierny, EnvironmentalJustice and Title VI Challenges to Permit Decisions: The 
EPAs Interim Guidance, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 1277, 1287 (1999). EPA's Title VI Guidance 
clearly states that, in addition to administrative remedies, "individuals may file a private 
right of action in court to enforce the nondiscrimination requirements in Title VI or EPA's 
implementing regulations without exhausting administrative remedies." EPA Title VI 
Guidance, supra note 27, at 39,671. The Guidance directs the reader to Powell v. Ridge, 
where the Third Circuit affirmed that citizens have a private right of action under regula-
tions promulgated according to section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. EPA 
Title VI Guidance, supra note 27, at 39,671; cf. Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 397-400 (3d 
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1047 (1999). 
59 The Supreme Court has taken the conservative position that courts should add a 
private right of action to a federal regulatory structure only where it is clear that such a 
remedy was intended by Congress. See JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 55, at 283; PETER W. Low 
& JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RiGHTS ACTIONS 251 (2d ed. 1994). Arguments against im-
plying a private remedy invoke concerns about the over-enforcement of federal standards, 
invasion of agency specialization in the elaboration of statutory standards, impairment of 
an agency's ability to devise a consistent and coordinated policy of enforcement, and di-
minishing the political accountability of those who administer federal programs. JEFFRIES 
ET AL., supra note 55, at 285. 
60 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, the Court refused to imply a private right of action to a 
stockholder to secure relief for a violation of the Federal Elections Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1974, but provided the four-factor test to guide future decisions. Id. at. 80-85. 
The Court determined that the remedy sought would not further the purpose of the stat-
ute. Id. at 84. 
61 Id. at 78. This question is answered by looking to the statute itself-which should 
expressly identify the class Congress intended to benefit. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 
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the court must find implicit or explicit evidence that Congress in-
tended to create the remedy.62 Third, the judicial remedy must be 
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme.63 
Finally, the creation of a federal right of action must not intrude on 
important state concerns.64 The Cort test emphasizes Congress' intent 
to benefit the plaintiffs and also to create a judicial remedy. 
Justice Scalia questioned the viability of a four-factored test in his 
concurring opinion in Thompson v. Thompson.65 The Thompson majority 
emphasized that "in determining whether to infer a private cause of 
action from a federal statute, our focal point is Congress' intent in 
enacting the statute" and indicated that the four-factor Cort test is in-
structive.66 Justice Scalia argued that congressional intent, one of the 
four elements in the Cort test, is the "determinative factor," and that the 
three remaining elements are "merely indicative" of the presence or 
absence of congressional intent.67 Justice Scalia asserted that the Su-
preme Court has "long since abandoned its hospitable attitude to-
wards implied rights of action. "68 He advocated, absent explicit evi-
dence of intent, that the Court adopt the "the categorical position 
that federal private rights of action will not be implied."69 Though the 
federal circuit courts continued to employ the Cort test, Justice Scalia 
U.S. 677, 689-90 (1979). In Cannon, the Court said "the right- or duty-creating language of 
the statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication 
of a cause of action." Id. at 690 n.13. 
62 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
MId. 
64 Id. The Third Circuit, in Powell u Ridge, extended the Curt test to apply beyond stat-
utes, finding it "appropriate in determining whether to infer a private right of action from 
an agency rule or regulation." 189 F.3d 387,397 (3d Cir. 1999), cm. denied, 528 U.S. 1047 
(1999). The case analyzed regulations promulgated by the Department of Education un-
der section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 390. Powell is discussed in detail in 
Parts II.B.2.b. and II.A2.b infra. 
65 484 U.S. 174, 188-91 (1988) (Scalia,J., concurring). The Supreme Court granted 
c(!f'tioran in Thompson to determine whether the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 
1980, 28 U .S.C. § 1789A, provides an implied cause of action in federal court. Id. at 175. 
66 Id. at 179. 
67Id. at 189 (Scalia,]., concurring). 
68 See id. at 190 (Scalia,]., concurring).Justice Scalia noted the "recent history of our 
holdings is one of repeated rejection of claims of an implied right." Id. (Scalia, j., concur-
ring). Justice Scalia argued that announcing a "flat rule that private rights of action will 
not be implied in statutes hereafter enacted" will provide certainty, and would eliminate 
the risk of misconstruing and frustrating congressional intent. Id. at 192 (Scalia,]., COIl-
curring). He recommended that the Court "get out of the business of implied private 
rights of action altogether." Id. (Scalia,j., concurring). 
69ld. at 191 (Scalia,J., concurring). 
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clearly revealed his hand in Thompson, foreshadowing the Supreme 
Court's treatment of implied rights of action in Sandoval.7o 
The Supreme Court developed its approach to implying a right 
of action to enforce Title VI in a series of decisions.71 Each case pro-
vided parts of the tests that the lower courts have used to determine 
whether a private right of action should be implied.72 In Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court established the im-
portant principal that 'Title VI must be held to proscribe only those 
racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or 
the Fifth Amendment. "73 One year later, in Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, the Court explicitly held that private litigants could sue to en-
force section 601 of Title VI.74 The Court did not doubt that "Con-
gress ... understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause 
of action for victims of the prohibited discrimination. "75 Building on 
the foundation of Bakke and Cannon, seven members of the Supreme 
70 See id. at 190-92 (Scalia,]., concurring); see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 
(2001) (holding that statutory intent is determinative). Some courts responded positively 
to Justice Scalia's dissent in Tlwmpson. See, e.g., Mallet v. Wis. Div. of Vocational Rehab., 130 
F.3d 1245, 1249 (7th Cir. 1997) (questioning the viability of the four-factor Cort approach 
and emphasizing singular focus on congressional intent); Chan v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 
96, 101 (2d Cir. 1993) (whether an implied right of action exists under a federal statute is 
strictly a matter of congressional intent). 
71 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo 
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Cannon V. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281-83 (1977). 
72 See Clwate, 469 U.S. at 293, Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. 582, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281-83. 
73 438 U.S. at 287. The Court relied on the legislative history of Title VI to conclude 
that it incorporates a constitutional, that is, an intent-based, standard for discrimination. 
See id. at 286-87. 
74 See generaUy 441 U.S. 677. 
75 441 U.S. at 703. Although the suit in Cannon concerned Title IX of the 1972 Educa-
tion Act Amendments, the Court's analysis relied on a parallel comparison to Title VI, 
which was a model for Title IX. See id. at 680-83, 694 n.16. The Court referred to Title Vi's 
legislative history, prior judicial interpretation of Title Vi's language, and congressional 
acquiescence to conclude that Congress intended to provide a private right of action to 
enforce Title IX. Title Vi's legislative history reflects "an assumption that Title VI would be 
judicially enforceable apart from the administrative procedures contained in § 602." Id. at 
712 n.49. For example, Senator Ribicoff said that "[iJn most cases, alternative remedies, 
principally lnwsuits to end discrimination" would be a more effective and preferable rem-
edy than terminating funding." Id. at 705 n.38 (1979) (quoting Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff, 
110 Congo Rec. 7067 (1964» (emphasis added). The Court wrote that "[iJt is always ap-
propriate to assume that our elected representatives ... know the law." Id. at 696-97. In 
the case of Title VI, the Court said, "[W]e are especially justified in presuming ... that 
those representatives were aware of the prior interpretation of Title VI." Id. at 697-98. 
Therefore, the Court interpreted the "absence of legislative action to change" the judicial 
implication of a private right of action to mean that "Congress at least acquiesces in, and 
apparently affirms" that interpretation. See id. at 703. 
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Court agreed that an implied right of action based on section 601 re-
quires proof of intentional discrimination in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil 
Service Commission.76 Finally, in Alexander v. Choate 77 the Court stated 
that Guardians provided a two-pronged holding on the nature of the 
discrimination proscribed by Title VI.78 The lessons from these cases 
are that "Title VI itself only directly reache [s] instances of intentional 
discrimination," and conduct that has a disparate impact on "minori-
ties [may] be redressed through agency regulations designed to im-
plement the purposes of Title VI. "79 
Thus, the Court left open the question of whether a private right 
should be implied to enforce a violation of the disparate-impact regu-
lations.8o Section 601 proved an ineffective legal tool for plaintiffs be-
cause, like constitutionally based claims, it required proof of inten-
tional discrimination.81 Therefore, environmental justice advocates 
believed that the disparate-impact regulations of section 602 offered 
the best opportunity for private citizens to bring suits against state or 
local agencies, but the Supreme Court had yet to expressly validate, or 
invalidate the approach.82 
In 1998, the Supreme Court was poised to answer whether a pri-
vate right of action could be implied to enforce section 602 of Title 
VI.83 The Court had granted certiorari to review a Third Circuit deci-
sion that recognized a private right of action to enforce section 602 
76 See 463 U.S. at 610-11 (Powell,j., joined by Burger, CJ. & Rehnquist,j., concurring 
in the judgment); id. at 612 (O'Connor,j., concurring in the judgment); id. at 642 (Stev-
ens, j., joined by Brennan & Blackmun, lJ. dissenting). Little was actually agreed upon in 
Guardiaru--six separate opinions were written and no opinion garnered a majority of 
votes. Justice Powell reluctantly wrote separately and stated, "Our opinions today will fur-
ther confuse rather than guide." Id. at 608 (Powell,J.,joined by Burger, CJ., concurring in 
the judgment). The Court was particularly divided regarding the standard of proof in Title 
VI discrimination cases. Id. at 608 n.l (Powell,j., joined by Burger, CJ., concurring in the 
judgment). Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens agreed that a violation of Title VI 
regulations could be established by proof of discriminating impact rather than intent. Id. 
(Powell,j., joined by Burger, CJ., concurring in thejudgment). 
77 See Choate, 469 U.S. at 294 n.ll. 
78 Id. at 293. 
79Id. 
80 See id. 
81 Cole, supra note 15, at 531 (environmental justice cases have relied on the regula-
tions implementing Title VI, rather than the statute itself). 
82 Private Cause of Action, supra note 49, at 23. 
8S See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality of Life v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 
1997), vacated as moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998). 
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regulations.84 Unfortunately, the underlying case became moot before 
the Court could resolve the question.85 The Court did not revisit the 
question until the summer of 2001-in Sandova~ in the interim, the 
lower courts were left to arrive at their own answers. 
2. Circuit Court Construction: Implying a Private Right to Enforce 
Section 602 Regulations 
In the absence of authoritative Supreme Court precedent, nearly 
all of the federal circuit courts held that a private right of action ex-
isted to enforce Title VI's disparate-impact regulations.86 The follow-
ing sections will review three cases arising in the Third Circuit, culmi-
nating with the most recent federal case to imply a private right of 
action to enforce EPA's regulations, South Camden Citizens in Action v. 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (Camden I) .87 The sub-
sequent history of Camden I will be discussed in Part III.B infra. 
a. Chester Residents for Quality Living v. Seif: The Third Circuit Implies 
a Private Right of Action to Enforce Section 602 Regulations 88 
The Third Circuit held that private plaintiffs could maintain an 
action under section 602's disparate-impact regulations in Chester Resi-
dents for Qy,ality Living v. SeiJ89 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
84 Id. Chester Residents represented the first time that an implied right of action under 
section 602 of Title VI had been addressed in the environmental permitting context. See 
Latham Worsham, sufrra note 15, at 665. 
85 Cole, supra note 15, at 531. 
86Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 295 n.l (2001) (Stevens, j., joined by Souter, 
Ginsburg & Breyer,lJ., dissenting). See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 400 (3d Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1046 (1999); Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 936; David K. v. Lane, 
839 F.2d 1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988) ("It is clear that plaintiffs may maintain a private cause 
of action to enforce the regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act .... 
Evidence of discriminatory effect is sufficient" to prevail.); see also N.Y Urban League, Inc. 
v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (plaintiff alleging violation of Title VI regu-
lations must make prima facie showing that challenged conduct has a disparate impact); 
Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981-82 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[P] roof of discriminatory effect 
suffices to establish liability when the suit is brought to enforce regulations issued pursuant 
to the statute rather than the statute itself."); Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 465 n.11 
(5th Cir. 1986). 
87 145 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.NJ. 2001), op. modified & supplemented by 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 
(D.NJ. 2001), order rev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002) 
(mem.) [Camden/]. 
86 132 F.3d at 927. 
89 Id. The Third Circuit considered "the purely legal question of whether a private 
right of action exists under discriminatory effect regulations promulgated by federal ad-
ministrative agencies pursuant to section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id. 
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review the Third Circuit's determination. The challenged permits 
were withdrawn shortly thereafter, however, and so the Supreme 
Court dismissed the case as moot and vacated the Third Circuit's de-
cision.9o Although the Third Circuit's opinion has been vacated, it 
remains instructive because it was the first decision handed down by 
one of the circuit courts considering a private right of action to en-
force EPA's Title VI regulations, and its analysis was actually revived in 
subsequent Third Circuit opinions.91 
In Chester Residents, a non-profit corporation, Chester Residents 
Concerned for Quality Living (CRCQL), sued the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Environmental Protection (PADEP) for issuing a permit 
to a waste treatment facility.92 PADEP has the authority to issue or 
deny applications for permits to operate waste processing facilities.93 
PADEP receives federal funding from EPA to administer its programs; 
consequently, its funding is conditioned upon its assurance that it will 
comply with Title VI and EPA's section 602 regulations.94 The CRCQL 
alleged that PADEP violated EPA's section 602 regulations because it 
disproportionately granted permits to waste facilities to operate in 
Chester, which is a minority community when compared to the make-
up of the county at large, which is predominantly white.95 
The Third Circuit reviewed judicial precedent and Title VI's leg-
islative history to determine whether the action could be main-
tained.96 The court began its analysis by distinguishing between sec-
tion 601 and section 602 of Title VI.97 It said that that a private right 
of action exists under section 601, but that this right only reaches in-
90 See id. Where an independent event-like the revocation of permits-renders the 
case moot, it is the Supreme Court's practice to vacate the underlying decision; conversely, 
the Court will allow the judgment in a mooted case to remain valid if the parties voluntar-
ily make the case moot. See, e.g., United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall 
P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 22-29 (1994); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 
(1950). 
91 See Powell, 189 F.3d at 397; infra notes 122 & 123 and accompanying text. 
92 132 F.3d at 927. 
93 Id. at 928. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. At the time of the decision in Chester Residents, the city of Chester, located in 
Delaware County, had a predominantly minority population: 65% of its 42,000 residents 
were black. Id. at 928 n.1. Delaware County, excluding Chester, had a much smaller minor-
ity population: only 6.2% of its approximately one half million residents were black. Id. 
96 See id. at 927. The court wrote that Guardians and its progeny "provide[] support for 
the existence of a private right of action." Id. While no other court had considered the 
precise issue, the Third Circuit found support for its conclusion among the other circuits. 
See id. at 936-37 
97 See id. at 929. 
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stances of intentional discrimination as opposed to instances of dis-
criminatory effect or disparate impact, 98 and "section 602 merely 
authorizes agencies that distribute funds to promulgate regulations 
implementing section 601.''99 The court approved of EPA's regulations 
as a valid exercise of agency authority.1OO 
The court looked to Supreme Court precedent, and it found that 
no case affirmed the existence of a private right of action under sec-
tion 602.101 Finding no answer to the question, the court set out to 
determine whether to imply a private right of action as a matter of 
first impression.102 It previously had: 
established a three prong test for determining when it is ap-
propriate to imply private rights of actions to enforce regula-
tions. The test requires a court to inquire: (1) whether the 
agency rule is properly within the scope of the enabling stat-
ute; (2) whether the statute under which the rule was prom-
ulgated permits the implication of a private right of action; 
and (3) whether implying a private right of action will fur-
ther the purpose of the enabling statute.10S 
The court determined that EPA's regulation satisfied the first 
prong.104 The court relied on the four-factor test announced in Cmt to 
98 Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 929 (relying on Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-
94 (1985». 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 See id. at 929-30. The court engaged in a "a close reading of the opinions in 
Guardians" and concluded that five Justices implicitly approved "the existence of a private 
right of action under discriminatory effect regulations implementing section 602 of Title 
VI." Id. Turning to Choate, the court found no direct authority in to confirm or deny the 
existence of a private right of" action. Id. 
lot See Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 932-33. 
lOS Id. This test originates from Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939 
(3d Cir. 1985). In A ngeiastro, the court explained that: 
Where the enabling statute authorizes an implied private right of action, 
courts should permit private suits under agency rules within the scope of the 
enabling statute if doing so is not at variance with the scope of the statute 
.... [I]f Congress intended to permit private actions for violations of the 
statute, it would be anomalous to preclude private parties from suing under 
the rules that impart meaning to the statute. 
764 F.2d at 947. 
104 See Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 933 (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 298,293 
(1985» (the Supreme Court has made clear that "'actions having an unjustifiable dispa-
rate impact on minorities [can] be redressed through agency regulations designed to im-
plement the purposes of Title VI.'''). 
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decide if the regulations satisfied the second prong of its own test.105 
It focused its analysis on two of the four Cort factors: "(1) whether 
there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either 
to create such a remedy or to deny one; and (2) whether it is consis-
tent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply 
such a remedy for the plaintiff. "106 
The United States, as amicus curiae, provided persuasive and 
uncontested evidence, that "implication of a private right of action 
[was] consistent with legislative intent," and the court was convinced 
that EPA's regulations satisfied the first Cort factor. 107 It then turned 
its attention to the second Cort factor: Is an implied private right con-
sistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme?108 
The court reasoned that a private lawsuit provides a fund recipi-
ent with notice that their conduct is being investigated, just like an 
administrative complaint would.I09 Therefore, private lawsuits are 
consistent with Title Vi's legislative scheme if the section 602 proce-
dural requirements are intended to provide notice.no Further, a judi-
cial remedy would not interfere with the existing administrative rem-
edy because the administrative remedy of terminating funding is not 
available in a private lawsuit.lll Consequently, the court concluded 
that implying a private right of action satisfied the second Cort factor 
because it would be consistent with the legislative scheme of Title 
VI.1l2 
The Third Circuit then considered if implying a right of action 
would satisty the third prong of its test-whether it would further the 
purpose of the enabling statute. ll3 It was persuaded that implying a 
right of action would "further the dual purposes of Title VI, which are 
to: (1) combat discrimination by entities who receive federal funds; 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 Id. The United States relied on various sources of legislative history, such as a 
House Report, comments in the Congressional Record, and compilations of testimony at 
congressional hearings to reach its conclusion. See id. at 933-34. It is relevant to note that 
the United States, writing as amicus curiae, has not since offered a contrary opinion, and so 
the government's position in Chester Residents could be considered its current position on 
the issue. 
lOB See id. at 934. 
109 See id. at 935-36. 
110 Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 935-36. 
III See id. at 935 (stating that "unlike the EPA, private plaintiffs do not have the author-
ity to terminate funding"). 
112 Id. at 936. 
mId. 
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and (2) provide citizens with effective protection against discrimina-
tion. "114 The private plaintiffs would act as "private attorneys general, " 
compensating for the reality that "EPA itself lacks sufficient resources 
to achieve adequate enforcement. "115 
b. Powell v. Ridge: The Third Circuit Resurrects Chester Residents 
In Powell v. Ridge,1I6 the Third Circuit again considered whether 
to provide a private right of action to enforce Title VI's implementing 
regulations-this time, regulations adopted by the Department of 
Education.ll7 The court recognized that the established test for imply-
ing a right of action under a statute is derived from Curt, and stated 
that a similar analysis that incorporates Curt's four factors may be ap-
plied to a regulation.lIS 
The court first acknowledged that Chester Residents, which an-
swered the same question, had been vacated as moot.1I9 It then pro-
ceeded to revive and adopt parts of the analysis that the Chester Resi-
dents court followed.12o The court described a hybrid test that should 
be used to determine whether a right of action exists under a regula-
tion.12l The test instructs the court to first ascertain whether a private 
right of action exists under the statute through which the regulation 
was promulgated.122 The inquiry is concluded if the court finds that 
Congress did not intend the statute to be enforced by private ac-
tions.123 If, however, the court finds that a private action exists under 
the statute, it must answer two questions: whether the agency rule is 
properly within the scope of the enabling statute, and whether imply-
ing a private right of action will further the purposes of the enabling 
statute. 124 
114 [d. at 935-36 (stating that "we agree with the United States that, to the extent that a 
private right of action will increase enforcement, the implication of that right of action will 
further the dual purposes of Title VI .... "). 
115 Id. 
116 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1046 (1999). 
117 Id. at 391. The plaintiffs challenged the education funding practices of the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania as having a racially discriminatory effect. Id. 
118Id. at 397. Like the Chester court, the court relied on Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Se-
curities, Inc., 764 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1985), for this conclusion. 
119 Poweu, 189 F.3d at 397. 
120 See id. at 397-400. 
121 Id. at 397-98; see supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
122 See id. This first step in Angelastro is also the objective of the Cort test. 
12S See id. at 398. 
124Id. (relying on Chester Residents Concerned for Quality of Life v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 
(3d Cir. 1997), vacated as moot, 524 U.S. 915 (1998». 
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The Powell court determined that as section 601 gives rise to a 
private right of action, and section 602 implements the mandate of 
section 601, it is proper to imply a right of action under section 602.125 
The court was satisfied that all three prongs test were met, and held 
that a private right of action existed under the regulations.126 The 
court's consideration of whether the plaintiff's claim could be main-
tained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is discussed in Part II.B.2 infra.127 
c. South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection: A Short-Lived Vidory for Environmentaljustice 
Plaintiffs 
The most recent case arising from the Third Circuit to consider 
whether Title VI authorizes a private right of action is Camden 1.128 
The case is important because it is the last federal case to imply a pri-
vate right of action under section 602 before the Supreme Court 
ended the practice in Sandoval. The case is unique because it has 
been analyzed under an implied right of action framework and a 
§ 1983 enforcement framework. 129 The subsequent history of Cam-
den I will be discussed in Part III.B infra. 
The complaint in Camden I alleged that the New Jersey Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) violated Title VI when it 
evaluated air permit applications and issued air permits for the opera-
tion of a cement facility in a minority neighborhood of Camden, New 
Jersey called Waterfront South.130 To understand the nature of the 
dispute, it is important to review the facts, as the district court did.13l 
The challenged cement facility was built by St. Lawrence Cement Co. 
(SLC); it grinds and processes granulated blast furnace slag (GBFS) 
l2& See Powel~ 189 F.3d at 399. The court relied on its reasoning in Angelastro v. Pruden-
tial-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1985). See supra 103 and accompanying text. 
126 See id. at 400. 
127 See infra notes 203-213 and accompanying text. 
128 145 F. Supp.2d 446, 472 (D.NJ. 2001), op. modified & supplemented by 145 
F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.NJ. 2001), orderrev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 
2621 (2002) (mem.). 
129 See generally S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 
F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.NJ. 2001) (finding that EPA regulations create a federal right that is 
enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), order rev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002) (mem.) [Camden II]; Camden!, 145 F. Supp.2d 446 (implying a 
private right of action under the EPA's Title VI regulations). 
130 Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 451-52. 
mId. at 450. These facts were included in the portion of the court's decision entitled 
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." 
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to manufacture cement products.132 The facility will emit pollutants-
including dust, mercury, lead, manganese, sulfur oxides, and volatile 
organic compounds-into the air when it operates.133 Additionally, 
trucks used to transport materials will contribute to air pollution by 
emitting ozone. 1M 
Waterfront South is predominantly a minority community; the 
most recent census figures reveal that ninety-one percent of its resi-
dents are persons of color.l35 The Waterfront South community is 
poor: over fifty percent of the residents live at or below the federal 
poverty leveI.l36 There is compelling evidence the community'S health 
is also poor.137 In their complaint, plaintiffs asserted that the chal-
lenged facility would aggravate and adversely impact their health 
through the emission of particulate matter and the production of 
ozone.l38 Waterfront South residents are already exposed to many pol-
m [d. at 452-53. GBFS is a by-product of the steel-making industry. [d. Prior to proc-
essing, particles of GBFS are the size and texture of beach sand. [d. Processing transforms 
the material to something that resembles powdered sugar. [d. SLC markets the processed 
GBFS as an additive used to strengthen cement. [d. Because of the nature of the GBFS, 
pollution is generated throughout the processing stages, including transport, grinding, 
and handling. See id. 
133 [d. at 453-54. 
154 See id. at 454. According to the courts statement of facts, on an annual basis, ap-
proximately 35,000 inbound delivery trucks will arrive at the facility, and 42,000 out-bound 
trucks will depart the facility. [d. 
155 [d. at 459. The population of Waterfront South is 63% black, 28.3% Hispanic, and 
9% non-Hispanic white. [d. at 459. Proportionately, Waterfront South has a larger minority 
population than either Camden County or the State of New Jersey. See id. In Camden 
County, 75.1 % of the population is non-Hispanic white, 16.2% is black and 7.2% is His-
panic. [d. In the State of New Jersey, only 20.6% of the population is identified as non-
white. [d. 
136 Camden [,145 F. Supp. 2d. at 459. In 1990, the median household income of Water-
front South residents was only $15,082. [d. This figure was lower than the either the me-
dian household income ($40,027) or even the per capita income ($15,773) of Camden 
County residents. [d. 
U7 [d. at 460. Plaintiffs presented unchallenged findings comparing bronchial and 
lung cancer and asthma rates of Camden County residents to the general population of 
New Jersey and of different racial groups within Camden County. [d. at 4~1. The 
findings report that the age-adjusted rate of death of black females in Camden County 
from asthma is over three times that for white females in Camden County; for men, the 
death rate is six times higher. [d. at 461. The age-adjusted cancer rate for black females is 
higher than ninety percent of the rest of the state, and the rate for black males is higher 
than seventy percent of the rest of the state. [d. 
1~8 [d. at 460. Plaintiffs presented testimony that the inhalation of fine particulate mat-
ter, such as that created by GBFS processing, exacerbates pre-existing respiratory illnesses, 
and can trigger asthma attacks. [d. at 462. The plaintiff's expert predicted that emissions 
from the challenged facility will increase the overall death rate by 1.2% for individuals who 
are most affected. [d. The court explicitly found the plaintiffs' evidence more credible, in 
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lutant-producing municipal and industrial facilities in or near their 
community.139 A recent study of Waterfront South, commissioned by 
the city of Camden, found that "the close proximity ()f residential and 
industrial uses, and unregulated truck traffic makes the spillover ef-
fects of noxious manufacturing or related industrial activity ... detri-
mental to ... residents. "140 The conditions in Waterfront South 
epitomize the cumulative nature of environmental degradation, and 
emphasize the difficulty of assigning accountability. 
In order to grant the preliminary injunction that was sought, the 
court had to find a prima facie case of disparate impact-namely that 
the NjDEP's facially neutral permitting policy was causally related to 
an adverse disparate impact on the plaintiffs based on their race, 
color or national origin.141 The court engaged in a thorough analysis 
of the evidence, and found that the permitting action would have ad-
verse impacts on the plaintiffs' health.142 The court noted that "injury 
to the environment, such as that alleged ... in this case, has been 
found ... to be especially difficult to remedy and unusually irrepara-
ble."143 The court then found that the statistical evidence revealed a 
"significant association between the permitting and placement of en-
vironmentally regulated facilities in New Jersey" and the racial com-
position of communities. l44 Finally, the court was persuaded that the 
NjDEP's permitting practices were causally linked to the disparate 
distribution of noxious facilities in New Jersey.l45 The defendants were 
unable to provide a substantial legitimate explanation or a legitimate 
part because of the failure of defendants to refute that evidence with medical or scientific 
evidence. Id. at 466. 
U9 Id. at 459. Municipal facilities in the area include a sewage treatment plant, a trash-
to-steam incinerator, and a co-generation facility that converts waste energy to produce 
heat or electricity. Id. Waterfront South is home to two Superfund sites, and the EPA has 
identified four sites within one-half mile of the challenged facility for the release or threat-
ened release of hazardous substances. Id. Additionally, the NJDEP has identified fifteen 
known contaminated sites in the Waterfront South neighborhood. Id. 
140 Id. at 460. 
141 Id. at 484-85. 
142 Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d. at 485-88. Importantly, the court rejected the defense 
argument that compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) will 
ensure that the impacts of a facility are not sufficiently adverse to trigger Title VI. Id. at 
487. Rather, such a showing only creates a presumption of non-adversity. Id. 
143 Id. at 499. 
144 Id. at 493. 
143 See id. at 494-95. The court pointed out the simple fact that without a permit from 
the NJDEP, industrial facilities cannot operate in New Jersey. See id. at 495. 
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non-discriminatory reason to rebut the court's finding of a prima fa-
cie case of disparate impact.I46 
The district court implied a private right of action, relying on 
Powell, where the Third Circuit explicitly reaffirmed its conclusion in 
Chester Residents that an implied right of action exists under sec-
tion 602 of Title VI.I47 The defense did not contest the existence of a 
private right of action under Title VI, conceding that Powell supports 
an implied private right of action.I48 The defendant did, however, as-
sert that it '''expects that the Supreme Court will find that there is no 
private right of action .... "'149 The court acknowledged that the Su-
preme Court was contemporaneously reviewing a Title VI case-Alex-
ander v. Sandova[l50-that raised the same legal question: whether a 
private right of action may be implied under Title VI.I51 
Regardless of defendant's suspicions, absent explicit Supreme 
Court authority to the contrary, Powell controlled the decision,152 The 
permits that were issued to the cement company were vacated: SLC 
was enjoined from operating its proposed facility.I53 Injunctive relief 
was appropriate because SLC's conduct posed a continued threat to 
the environment, and the harm to the environment was not out-
weighed by harm to the defendant or the public interest. I54 The vic-
tory was brief; Sandoval, discussed at Part III.A infra, followed closely 
on it's heels. 
B. Using 42 U.S.c. § 1983 to Enforce Title V7 
Instead of seeking an implied private right of action to enforce 
Title VI or its regulations, litigants have used 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bring 
suit. Section 1983 provides a cause of action to any person who is de-
prived of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws" ofthe United States by any person acting under color 
146 See id. at 496-97. 
147Id. at 474 (citing Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 397-400 (3d Cir. 1999». The law 
was apparently so clear that the court devoted only one and one half pages of its nearly 
sixty-page decision to determine that a private cause of action exists under Title VI. See id. 
at 473-74. 
148 Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d. at 474. 
149Id. 
150 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
151 Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 473. 
152 Id. at 473. 
153 Id. at 505. 
154 See id. at 500-02. 
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of state law. I55 Thus, litigants use § 1983 to enforce their rights that 
are provided by Title VI. 
Statutory § 1983 claims differ from implied private rights of ac-
tion, and generally are favorable to plaintiffs. I56 These § 1983 claims 
do not present the same separation of powers concerns as an implied 
private right of action because Congress has expressly authorized 
§ 1983 suits.157 Because congressional intent is explicit, the plaintiff 
does not need to prove that Congress intended to allow private suits, 
as she does in implied right of action cases. I5S 
A judicial determination that § 1983 is available to remedy a 
statutory violation involves a two-step inquiry.159 As a threshold matter, 
the plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right. I6o Then, once 
the court finds that there is an enforceable right, the burden shifts to 
the defendant to show that Congress has explicitly or implicitly pre-
cluded the suit.l6I 
155 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Section 1983 provides in full: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
Id. (emphasis added). Section 1983 limits the pool of potential defendants to state actors 
and those acting "under the color of state law." Id. Therefore, a litigant employing § 1983 
will be more limited than someone using an implied right, but this issue is beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
156 See Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
157 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 21 
n.31 (1981); see also Bradford C. Mank, Using §1983 to Enforce Title vn Section 602 Regula-
tions, 49 U. RAN. L. REv. 321, 323 (2001) [hereinafter Section 602 Regukztions]. This explicit 
authorization of a private action removes concerns about illegitimate judicial lawmaking. 
See Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 394, 415 (1982). 
158 Samuels, 770 F.2d at 194. Because § 1983 creates an express cause of action against 
state officials for violations of federal law, "section 1983 plaintiffs do not bear the burden 
of demonstrating that Congress specifically intended to preserve the ability of private par-
ties to enforce the relevant provisions of federal law against those officials. HId. It has been 
suggested that Congress is "presumed to legislate against a background of section 1983 
and thus to contemplate private enforcement against state and municipal actors absent 
fairly discernable intent to the contrary." Id. Again, the accuracy of this reasoning depends 
of course on whether Congress is actually aware of what the courts are doing. 
159 See, e.g., Golden State Trans. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989); 
Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20; Section 602 Regukztions, supra note 157, at 323. 
160 See Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106. 
161 See id. 
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1. Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to Sue for Violations of Statutory Rights: 
Supreme Court Precedent 
In Maine v. Thiboutot, the Supreme Court held that § 1983 pro-
vides a cause of action for violations of federal statutes as well as the 
Constitution.162 The Court rejected the argument that the phrase 
"and laws" should be limited to civil rights or equal protection laws, 
stating that the "legislative history does not demonstrate that the 
plain language was not intended. "163 The Supreme Court has consis-
tently held that § 1983 speaks in terms of "rights, privileges or immuni-
ties," not merely violations of federal law, and so, the first question to 
answer is: What is a "right"?164 
The Court has fashioned a three-pronged test to determine 
whether a statute creates an enforceable right.165 This test originated 
in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass 'nl66 and was affirmed in Blessing v. Free-
162 448 U.S. 1,4 (1980). The dissent criticized the majority, stating: 
[T]he Court's decision today significantly expands the concept of "civil 
rights" and creates a major new intrusion into state sovereignty under our 
federal system. There is no probative evidence that Congress intended to 
authorize the pervasive judicial oversight of state officials that will flow from 
the Court's construction of § 1983. Although today's decision makes new law 
with far-reaching consequences, the Court brushes aside the critical issues of 
congressional intent, national policy, and the force of past decisions of prece-
dent. 
Id. at 33 (Powell, j., joined by Burger, CJ. & Rehnquist, j., dissenting). In Thibautot, the 
court held that § 1983 encompasses claims that are based on purely statutory violations of 
federal law. See id. at 7-8. More recently, courts have considered, with varying results, 
whether § 1983 can enable a citizen to sue for purely regulatory violations. See infra Part 
II.B.2 for discussion of relationship between § 1983 rights and regulations. 
163 Id. at 8. The court commented that the legislative history relating to the addition of 
the phrase "and laws" is "scanty," and that Congress has "remained quiet in the face of our 
many pronouncements on the scope of § 1983." Id. at 7, 8; see also JEFFRIES ET AL., supra 
note 55, at 283; George D. Brown, Whither Thiboutot? Section 1983, Private Enforcement and 
the Damages Dilemma, 33 DEPAUL L. REv. 31, 37 (1983). The Court's emphasis on Congress' 
silence reflects their reasoning in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979),just a 
year earlier: Congress' silence in response to judicial implication of a right of action 
amounts to implicit approval. See supra note 75. 
164 The plaintiff must prove something more that a simple violation of a law. See Blessing 
v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) 
(quoting Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106); Todd E. Pettys, The Intended Relationship Between 
Administrative Regulations and Section 1983's "Laws," 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 68 (1998). 
165E.g., Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340; Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509. The Court has not yet provided 
a test for determining when an administrative regulation can create an enforceable right 
under § 1983-if it may at all. 
166 496 U.S. 498 (1990). In Wilder, the plaintiffs, health care providers, brought a 
§ 1983 suit to enforce an amendment to the Medicaid Act. Id. at 501. They asserted that 
the formula used by Virginia did not generate reasonable and adequate reimbursement 
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stone.l67 First, a court must find that Congress intended that the provi-
sion benefit the plaintiff.l68 Second, the provision must create a bind-
ing obligation on the government-the language of the statute must 
be mandatory.169 Finally, the provision must be judicially enforce-
able-it must be "sufficiently specific and definite. "170 The Court has 
not yet provided a similar test for determining whether an administra-
tive regulation creates an enforceable right; the hints that the Court 
has revealed are discussed in Part II.B.2.a infra. 
If the plaintiff demonstrates that there is indeed a federal right, a 
presumptive remedy exists under § 1983. The burden then shifts to 
the defendant, who must rebut this presumption by demonstrating 
that Congress intended to foreclose the remedy.l7l This is a difficult 
burden; there is a strong presumption in favor of the § 1983 rem-
edy.172 The Supreme Court has said, 'We do not lightly conclude that 
rates for economically and efficiently operated hospitals, as defined by the statute. See id. at 
503-04. The Supreme Court determined that an amendment to the Medicaid Act created 
a right to reasonable and adequate rates, and therefore was enforceable under § 1983. See 
id. at 524. Chief Justice Rehnquist,joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, dis-
sented.ld.524-29 (Rehnquist, CJ., joined by O'Connor, Scalia Be Kennedy,lJ., dissenting). 
167 520 u.S. 329 (1997). In Blessing, parents of children who were entitled to receive 
child support services pursuant to Title IV-D, sued the director of the state child support 
agency under § 1983. Id. at 332-33. The parents claimed that they had an enforceable 
right to have the program achieve substantial compliance with the requirements of Title 
IV-D. Id. at 332. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the statutory provision was not intended to benefit 
the individual children or their parents. See id. at 344-49. The Court reasoned that the 
standard of "substantial compliance" was not meant to create individual entitlement to 
services, but rather, act as a yardstick to measure the system-wide performance of a state's 
Title IV-D program. Id. at 343. Justices Scalia and Kennedy emphasized that the plaintiffs 
were at best, third party beneficiaries. Id. at 349 (Scalia, j., joined by Kennedy, j., concur-
ring). The Justices compared the agreement between the state and the federal 
government to a contract, and did not approve of allowing third-party beneficiaries of 
commitments to the federal government to sue for non-compliance. See id. (Scalia, j., 
joined by Kennedy,J., concurring). 
168 See id. 
169 See, e.g, Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 (stating that the provision must reflect more than a 
congressional preference); Pennhurst State Sch. Be Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 
(1981) (noting that congressional innuendo and declarations of policy or preference fall 
short of creating enforceable obligations and rights) . 
170 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509, 511. 
171 Wright v. City of Roanoke Hous. Be Redev. Auth., 479 U.S. 406, 423 (1986) (holding 
that § 1983 provides a remedial cause of action unless the state actor demonstrates by ex-
press provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to 
foreclose such private enforcement). 
172 Compare this strong presumption and the Court's reluctance to remove the § 1983 
remedy to the Court's progressive contraction of an implied private right of action. The 
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Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for the 
deprivation of a federally secured right. "173 Congress may foreclose a 
remedy under § 1983 expressly, by forbidding recourse to § 1983 in 
the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforce-
ment scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under 
§ 1983.174 
Absent express withdrawal, the Court has found that Congress 
has foreclosed private enforcement by implication based on a 
sufficiently comprehensive remedial scheme only twice.175 In Middlesex 
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers, intent to foreclose 
resort to § 1983 was found in the comprehensive remedial scheme 
provided by Congress.176 The scheme was sufficient to preclude the 
§ 1983 remedy because it "provided for private actions and left no 
room for additional private remedies."177 Similarly, in Smith v. Robin-
son, the Court held that a carefully tailored statutory remedial scheme 
precluded plaintiffs actions under § 1983.178 More often however, the 
Supreme Court found that the statutory remedy-such as an agency's 
authority to cut off funding-is insufficient to preclude access to the 
§ 1983 remedy.179 
explanation for the difference must be that the Court is sufficiently confident that Con-
gress intended that there be a remedy in the § 1983 context. 
m Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508. The Supreme Court has stressed that a plaintiff's ability to 
invoke § 1983 cannot be defeated simply by "the availability of administrative mechanisms 
to protect the plaintiff's interests." Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,347 (1997) (quoting 
Golden State Transit Corp., v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989». 
174 See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341. 
175 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521; see Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984); Middlesex 
County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea ClammersAss'n, 453 U.S. 1,20 (1981). 
176 453 U.S. at 20. The Sea Clammers Court reasoned when the statutory remedial de-
vices provided are sufficiently comprehensive, they may provide evidence of congressional 
intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983. [d. at 11-12. The Court found that 
the controverted statutes contained "unusually elaborate enforcement provisions." [d. at 
13. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, stated that "it is hard to believe that Congress 
intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created so many specific statutory 
remedies, including the two citizen-suit provisions." [d. at 20. The Court was particularly 
sensitive to separation of powers concerns, writing, "Where, as here, Congress has made 
clear that implied private actions are not contemplated, the courts are not authorized to 
ignore this legislative judgment." [d. at 18. 
177 See Wright, 479 U.S. at 423. 
178 468 U.S. at 1012. 
179 See, e.g., Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347-48; Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508; Wright, 479 U.S. at 428. 
218 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 30:191 
2. Can Administrative Regulations Create Enforceable § 1983 Rights? 
Since Thiboutot, federal courts have been asked to take the 
Court's rationale "one step further," to find that § 1983 can provide a 
remedy for violations of rights secured by regulations, in addition to 
statutes.180 The Supreme Court has not decisively answered the ques-
tion of whether regulations may create a right that is enforceable un-
der § 1983-but different members of the current Supreme Court 
have revealed their biases on occasion.181 It is instructive to review the 
limited guidance that Supreme Court Justices have provided before 
examining the conclusions that the lower federal courts have reached. 
a. The Supreme Court's Conflicting Signals 
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, Justice Stevens mentioned that, 
in some circumstances, § 1983 may provide an "alternative and ex-
press cause of action" to an implied right of action in Title VI cases.182 
While Cannon was limited to the statute itself, Justice Stevens further 
developed his § 1983 analysis from Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service 
Commission.18s There, he wrote, "[i]t is clear that the § 1983 remedy is 
intended to redress the deprivation of rights secured by all valid fed-
eral laws, including statutes and regulations having the force of law. "184 
Justice Stevens first used the phrase "force of law," in Chrysler Corp. v. 
Brown, which was not a § 1983 case,185 There, the Court opined that 
"[i]n order for a regulation to have the 'force and effect of law,' it 
must have certain substantive characteristics and be the product of 
certain procedural requisites. "186 
180 See Pettys, supra note 164, at 52. 
181 See id. at 71. 
182 See 441 U.S. 677, 696-97 n.21, 702-03 n.33 (1979); see supra text accompanying note 
75. This alternative would not be available in a suit against private defendants. 
183 See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
184 Id. at 638 (Stevens,j.,joined by Brennan & Blackmun,.D., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
185 See generally 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
186 Id. at 301. The Court applied a three-part test to determine whether a regulation 
has the "force oflaw." See id. at 301-03,313-14. First, the regulation must be a "substantive 
rule[]," rather than an interpretive rule. Id. at 301-02. This means that the regulation 
must "affect individual rights and obligations." Id. at 302. Second, the agency's authority 
must be rooted in a grant of such power by Congress. Id. at 302-03. Third, the agency must 
have conformed with any congressional procedural requirements when it promulgated the 
regulation.ld. at 313-14. The Court noted that it had given weight to the Attorney Gen-
eral's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947), which referred to substantive 
rules as those "that 'implement' the statute." Id. at 302 n.31. 
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Justice Stevens recognized that Thiboutot concerned federal stat-
utes, not regulations, but asserted that its § 1983 analysis "applies 
equality to administrative regulations having the force of law. "187 He 
argued that Title VI's section 602 regulations have "the force of law" 
and are therefore enforceable under § 1983.188 Justice O'Connor 
strongly disagreed with Justice Stevens' assessment, suggesting that 
the regulations are actually inconsistent with the statute itself because 
they exceed the statute's mandate.189 
In Wright v. City oj Roanoke Housing & Redevelopment Authority, the 
Court found that plaintiffs enjoyed a cause of action under § 1983 to 
challenge a violation of the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment's section 602 regulations. 190 The dissenting Justices, 
O'Connor, Rehnquist, Powell and Scalia, discussed their concern that 
a regulation could independently create an actionable right under 
§ 1983.191 Justice O'Connor worried that 
lurking behind the Court's analysis may be the view that, 
once it has been found that a statute creates some enforce-
able right, any regulation adopted within the purview of the 
statute creates rights enforceable in federal courts, regard-
less of whether Congress or the promulgating agency ever 
contemplated such a result.192 
187 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 638 n.6 (Stevens,j.,joined by Brennan & Blackmun,.n., dis-
senting). 
188 See id. (Stevens, j., joined by Brennan & Blackmun, .n., dissenting) In dissent, Jus-
tice Stevens asserted that "[ilt is well settled that when Congress explicitly authorizes an 
administrative agency to promulgate regulations implementing a federal statute ... those 
regulations have the force of law so long as they are 'reasonably related to the purposes of 
the enabling legislation.'" ld; at 643 (Stevens, j., joined by Brennan & Blackmun, .n., dis-
senting) (quoting Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 359 (1973». Stev-
ens concluded that "[bly prohibiting grant recipients from adopting procedures that deny 
program benefits to members of any racial group, the administrative agencies have acted 
in a reasonable manner to further the purposes of Title VI." ld. at 643-44 (Stevens, j., 
joined by Brennan & Blackmun,.n., dissenting). While plaintiffs must prove discriminatory 
intent to prove a violation of the statute, they must only show that the challenged actions 
produce discriminatory effects to prove a violation of valid federal law-namely the regula-
tions. See id. at 645 (Stevens,j.,joined by Brennan & Blackmun,.n., dissenting). 
189 See id. at 615 (Stevens,j.,joined by Brennan & Blackmun,.n., dissenting). 
190 479 U.S. 418, 419 (1986). 
191 See id. at 432-41 (O'Connor, j., joined by Rehnquist, Cj., Powell & Scalia, .n., dis-
senting). The Court found that plaintiffs enjoyed a cause of action under § 1983 to chal-
lenge a violation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development's section 602 
regulations. ld. at 419. 
1921d. at 438 (O'Connor,j.,joined by Rehnquist, CJ., Powell & Scalia,.n., dissenting). 
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The dissenters reaffirmed their commitment to finding congressional 
intent, writing that "[s]uch a result, where determination of § 1983 
'rights' has been unleashed from any connection to congressional in-
tent, is troubling indeed. "193 The dissent in Wright is cited as persua-
sive by federal courts as often as the majority opinion.I94 These cases 
establish the positions that the Justices have aligned themselves with, 
and the possible routes that the lower courts might follow. And they 
provide the foundation for hypotheses regarding the Court's ultimate 
resolution of the matter. 
b. The Circuit Courts Reach Different Conclusions 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the Supreme Court 
guidance lacks clarity. Consequently, a split exists among the circuit 
courts.195 Some courts have held that regulations may create rights 
enforceable under § 1983 if the regulations meet certain criteria, and 
other courts are unwilling to find that regulations can create § 1983 
rights under any circumstances, if the right is not explicit in the stat-
ute.196 Prior to Alexander v. Sandova4 the Sixth and Third Circuit had 
allowed for a § 1983 remedy for violations of federal rights, and the 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits denied the remedy.I97 These positions 
195 See id. (O'Connor,J.,joined by Rehnquist, CJ., Powell Be Scalia,.D., dissenting). 
194 See, e.g., Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1009-12 (11th Cir. 1997); Pettys, supra 
note 164, at 73; infra text accompanying note 221. 
195 Compare Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 403 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a § 1983 
claim is not incompatible with Title VI or its regulations), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1047 
(1999), and Loschiavo v. City of Dearbom, 33 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 
U.S. 1150 (1995) (observing that a regulation can create an enforceable right under 
§ 1983), with Harris, 127 F.3d at 1009 (holding that a regulation does not create a right 
unless it defines a right already provided in the statute), and Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 
984 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that an administrative regulation cannot create a right that is 
not implicit in the statute), and Smith v. Palmer, 24 F. Supp. 2d 955 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (re-
jecting the argument that mandatory language in a regulation alone is sufficient to create 
a protected right). See generally Pettys, supra note 164, at 72 (discussing discord among cir-
cuits). 
196 See Pettys, supra note 164, at 76. 
197 Compare PflUJeu, 189 F.3d. at 401-03, and Boatman v. Hammons, 164 F.3d 286, 289 
(6th Cir. 1998) (holding federal regulations "must be characterized as 'law' under section 
1983" because they have the force oflaw), and Levin v. Childers, 101 F.3d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 
1996) (adopting three-part test to determine whether a federal statute or regulation cre-
ates rights enforceable under § 1983), and Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 550, with Harris, 127 F.3d 
993 (administrative regulation cannot create a right not rooted in the statute), and Smith, 
821 F.2d 980 (same). 
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have shifted since Sandoval.198 The following section will discuss the 
circuit positions prior to the Sandoval decision. 
In Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, the Sixth Circuit considered 
whether plaintiffs had a right to enforce a Federal Communications 
Commission regulation under § 1983.199 It began by asserting: "As 
federal regulations have the force of law, they likewise may create en-
forceable rights."2oo The court then applied the Supreme Court's 
three-pronged test directly to the regulation to determine whether it 
actually defined a right that is enforceable under § 1983.201 It con-
cluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to bring a § 1983 action.202 
Prior to Sandoval, the Third Circuit also held that regulations 
could create rights that are enforceable under § 1983.203 In Powell v. 
Ridge, in addition to implying a private right of action under the regu-
lations, the court held that a claim could be maintained under § 1983 
for violation of the Department of Education's Title VI regulations.204 
The court determined two issues: first, it found that the regulations 
created an enforceable right, and second, that a § 1983 remedy was 
not precluded.205 
Much of the court's § 1983 analysis built upon its conclusions 
concerning implied rights of action.206 The court addressed tradi-
tional separation of powers concerns, and rejected the argument that 
"holding that private suits may be brought under the regulation 
would effectively permit administrative regulations to create substan-
tive law. "207 The court reasoned that the regulations, though created 
under section 602, implemented section 601 and said that 
"[ 0] bviously, the Supreme Court did not believe that that administra-
198 See infra Part III.B. 
199 Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 550. The plaintiffs contended that a local zoning ordinance 
violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and asserted that the 
local ordinance was preempted by the FCC regulation. See id. They filed suit in federal 
court under § 1983 to enforce the rights conferred by the regulation. See id. 
200 [d. at 551. The court endorsed Justice Stevens' "force oflaw" test. [d. 
201 See id. The three factors to consider are: (1) was the provision intended to benefit 
the plaintiff; (2) does the provision create a binding obligation on the government; and 
(3) is the right sufficiently specific to be judicially enforceable. E.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 
520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997); Wilderv. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990); Loschiavo, 33 
F.3d. at 551. 
202 Loschiavo, 33 F.3d. at 553; see also Boatman, 164 F.3d at 289; Levin, 101 F.3d at 47. 
20' See grmerally Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d. 387 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1046 
(1999). 
204 See id. at 403; supra Part II.B.2.b. 
205 See Powel~ 189 F.3d. at 400-02. 
206 See id. 401-02 (focusing on elements other than creation of a federal right). 
207 [d. at 399. 
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tive regulations that prohibit disparate impact were an impermissible 
creation of substantive law. "208 It is not clear that the court would have 
found an enforceable § 1983 right if had not first determined that an 
implied right of action was also appropriate.209 
The defendants had the difficult burden of proving that allowing 
a § 1983 remedy would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tai-
lored scheme because the court found no direct evidence that 'Title 
VI [or its] regulations were intended to restrict the availability of re-
lief under § 1983. "210 The court distinguished Powell from the two rare 
situations in Sea Clammers and Robinson, where the Supreme Court 
"found a remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to supplant 
§ 1983."211 Rather, the court compared Powell to those instances where 
the Supreme Court found that an agency's authority to cut off federal 
funding was insufficient to justify the denial of a § 1983 remedy,212 
concluding that a § 1983 suit is not incompatible with Title VI and the 
Title VI regulation.213 
Conversely, the Fourth Circuit held that "[a]n administrative 
regulation . . . cannot create an enforceable § 1983 interest not al-
ready implicit in the enforcing statute."214 The Eleventh Circuit 
reached a similar conclusion in Harris v. James. 215 In Harris, the plain-
tiffs-appellees brought a class action under § 1983, alleging that Ala-
bama's Medicaid plan did not comply with a federal regulation that 
required state plans to ensure transportation of recipients to and 
from providers.216 The right that the plaintiffs asserted did not appear 
208 Id. at 399-400. The court may be overreading what the Supreme Court has said. 
Some Justices have made clear that they are concerned that the regulations themselves 
may not be valid. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Hous. & Redev. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 438 
(1986) (O'Connor,j., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., Powell & Scalia,lJ., dissenting); Guardians 
Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 614-15 (1983) (O'Connor,J, concurring in the 
judgment). 
209 See Powel~ 189 F.3d at 399-401. 
210 Id. at 401. 
211 Id. at 401-02; see supra notes 175-178 and accompanying text. 
212 Powel~ 189 F.3d at 402. The court emphasized that the mere availability of adminis-
trative enforcement mechanisms--such as Title Vi's termination of funding-is not 
sufficient to defeat a "plaintiff's ability to invoke § 1983." Id. The court reasoned that Title 
VI "does not specifically provide individual plaintiffs with any administrative remedy" be-
cause although an individual may file a complaint with the funding agency, she "has no 
role in the investigation or adjudication ... of the complaint." Id. at 402. 
mId. at 403. 
214 Smith V. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987). 
215}27 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997). 
216Id. at 995. 
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explicitly in the Medicaid Act, but in a regulation, which plaintiffs ar-
gued was a valid interpretation of statutory provisions.217 
The court held that the plaintiffs did not have a federal right to 
transportation that could be enforced through § 1983.218 The regula-
tion was not enforceable in a § 1983 action because the regulation did 
not define the content of any specific statutory right. 219 The court 
dismissed Justice Stevens' "force of law" approach in favor of the dis-
sent in Wright that suggested that "'federal rights' enforceable under 
§ 1983 cannot derive either from valid regulations alone or from any 
and all valid administrative interpretations of statutes creating federal 
rights. "220 The court confidently relied on the arguments expressed by 
the Wright dissent because it determined that the majority in Wright 
did not reject the dissent's position.221 
According to the Eleventh Circuit, federal rights must ultimately 
be rooted, either implicitly or explicitly, in the statute.222 It asserted 
that "the driving force behind the Supreme Court's case law ... is a 
requirement that courts find a [c]ongressional intent to create a par-
ticular federal right. "223 This requirement reflects the focus on intent 
that dominates the implied right of action analysis, suggesting that a 
plaintiff who fails under that standard will similarly fail under a § 1983 
standard. The court stated: 
[I]f the regulation defines the content of a statutory provi-
sion that creates no federal right under the three-prong test, 
or if the regulation goes beyond explicating the specific con-
tent of the statutory provision and imposes distinct obliga-
tions in order to further the broad objectives underlying the 
statutory provision, we think the regulation is too far re-
moved from [c]ongressional intent to constitute a "federal 
right" enforceable under § 1983.224 
217 [d. at 1005. Plaintiffs asserted that the regulatory and statutory provisions, read to-
gether, create a federal right to transportation to and from Medicaid providers. [d. 
218 [d. at 1012. 
219 See id. at 1007-08. 
220 [d. at 1006. The court also relied on the Fourth Circuit's position in Smith. [d. at 
1007. 
221 Harris, 127 F.3d at 1007. The court acknowledged that if the Wright majority had re-
jected the dissent's position, then the majority approach would have been binding. See id. 
222 [d. at 1009 n.21. 
22~ [d. at 1008. 
224 [d. at 1009. The court specifically rejected the Sixth Circuit's approach: "finding a 
'federal right' in any regulation that in its own right meets the three-prong 'federal rights' 
test." [d. 
224 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 30:191 
The court's reasoning emphasizes the same concerns expressed by 
Justice O'Connor about Title VI in Guardians, where she noted that 
section 602 regulations may be inconsistent with the language of the 
statute itself. 225 
In summary, these cases demonstrate that the circuit courts dis-
agree substantially on whether a regulation may create an enforceable 
federal right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Prior to Sandoval, some courts 
required a nexus between the regulation and the statute. Although 
the right of action under § 1983 is explicit, this requirement reflects 
an unwillingness to enforce a right that Congress may have never in-
tended to create. 
III. CLOSING THE COURTROOM DOOR TO TITLE VI "DISPARATE 
IMPACT" PLAINTIFFS 
A. The Supreme Court's Surprising Decision in Alexander v. Sandoval 
The implied right of action debate came to a close before the 
Supreme Court in 2001; in Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court severely 
limited access to federal courts for plaintiffs asserting a violation of 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.226 The Court held that individuals do 
not have a private right of action to enforce section 602 regulations.227 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reversed an Eleventh Circuit 
decision, ruling that individuals cannot sue federally funded state 
agencies over policies that have a disparate impact on members of 
minority groups.228 The Court was sharply divided five to four; Justice 
Stevens' dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, criti-
cized the majority decision as "unfounded in our precedent and hos-
225 See id. at 1011-12; supra note 192 and accompanying text. The court suggested that 
the nexus between the regulation and congressional intent might be strong enough to 
"support the validity of a regulation," even though it was too weak to support the conclu-
sion that Congress had intended to create a right that would be enforceable under § 1983. 
See 127 F.3d at 1011-12. 
226 532 U.S. 275, 276-77 (2001). Some courts have interpreted Sandoval to foreclose 
access to a § 1983 remedy as well. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. 
Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002) (mem.) [CarndenII1]; 
Bonnie v. Bush, 180 F. Supp. 2d 132'1 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
227 Sandova~ 532 U.S. at 293. 
228 The case concerned the Alabama Department of Public Safety's compliance with 
Federal Department of Transportation regulations. Id. at 278-79. The Department of Pub-
lic Safety elected to only administer driver's license exams in English. Id. The plaintiffs 
sought to enjoin the English-only policy, arguing that it violated the federal regulations 
because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on 
their national origin. [d. 
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tile to decades of settled expectations. "229 Sandoval forced environ-
mental justice advocates and plaintiffs-including the parties in the 
Camden cement case-to rethink their litigation strategies. 
The Supreme Court first affirmed that private individuals can sue 
to enforce section 601 of Title VI, but ruled that section 601 prohibits 
only intentional discrimination.2!lO Then, for the purpose of its in-
quiry, the Court assumed that the regulations promulgated under sec-
tion 602 validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on 
racial groupS.2S1 Because section 602 forbids conduct that section 601 
permits, the section 602 regulations "do not simply apply" sec-
tion 601 's directive.2!l2 The Court emphasized that "[flar from display-
ing congressional intent to create new rights, § 602 limits agencies to 
'effectuat[ing]' rights already created by § 601," and that right is to be 
free from intentional discrimination.2!l!l 
The Court focused on evidence of congressional intent to create 
a private right under section 602.2!l4 Under the Cort test, intent was 
one of four factors to be considered, but under Sandova4 "[s]tatutory 
mId. at 294 (Stevens,j.,joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,.D., dissenting). The de-
cision reversed nearly three decades of precedent, including, as Justice Stevens empha-
sized, the unanimous views of the nine federal appeals courts to have addressed the issue. 
Stevens wrote that the "settled expectations the Court undercuts today derive not only 
from judicial decisions, but also from the consistent statements and actions of Congress." 
Id. at 302 n.9 (Stevens,j.,joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,.D., dissenting). 
230 Id. at 280-81. See gmarally Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (holding that 
Title VI itself only reaches intentional discrimination); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo 
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (finding that section 601 only forbids intentional discrimi-
nation). 
251 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-82.Justice Scalia took care to emphasize that no Supreme 
Court opinion has ever held that section 602 disparate-impact regulations are in fact valid. 
[d. Some commentators worry that Justice Scalia is inviting a challenge to the validity of 
disparate-impact regulations themselves. See Supreme Court Puts Skids on EJ Litigation, 14 
CAL. ENVTI... INSIDER 2 (2001). Whether the Supreme Court ultimately explicitly supports 
an agency's authority to promulgate disparate-impact regulations under section 602-that 
go beyond the prohibition of intentional discrimination in section 601-will be critical to 
the future viability of environmental justice claims. See Bruce Taterka, Environmental justice 
Risesfrom t11£ Ashes of Titk VI, 16 NAT. REsOURCES & ENV'T 317,319-20 (2001). 
252 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289. 
255 [d. Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that "the majority's statutory analysis does vio-
lence to both the text and the structure of Title VI." [d. at 304 (Stevens, J., joined by 
Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,.D., dissenting). Rather than section 601 and section 602 exist-
ing in isolation, Stevens writes that the Supreme Court has "treated § 602 as granting the 
responsible agencies the power to issue broad prophylactic rules aimed at realizing the 
vision laid out in § 601, even if the conduct captured by these rules" is broader than that 
prohibited by section 601. [d. at 305 (Stevens,J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,.D., 
dissenting) . 
254 See id. at 286. 
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intent ... is determinative. "235 The Court was troubled by the absence 
of private plaintiffs from the statutory language, it wrote: 
[T] he focus of § 602 is twice removed from the individuals 
who will ultimately benefit from Title VI's protection .... 
Section 602 ... focuses neither on the individuals protected 
nor even on the funding recipients being regulated, but on 
the agencies that will do the regulating. 236 
The Court reasoned that statutes that focus on the person regulated 
rather than the individuals protected create "'no implication of an 
intent to confer rights on a particular class ofpersons."'237 Any benefit 
to the plaintiffs should be considered incidental, as they are, in es-
sence, strangers to the statute.238 
The Court rejected the argument that the "regulations contain 
rights-creating language and so must be privately enforceable .... ''239 
It found that the rights creating language that compelled the Court to 
imply a right of action under section 601 in Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago is totally absent from section 602.240 The Court demanded that 
the right originate in the statute because although "[l]anguage in a 
regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through 
statutory text created, ... it may not create a right that Congress has 
not." 241 Justice Scalia warned that it is "incorrect to say that language 
in a regulation can conjure up a private cause of action that has not 
235 See id. The Court's singular focus on congressional intent calls to mind Justice 
Scalia's dissent in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188-91 (1988), where he ques-
tioned the validity of the four-factor Cort test. It is now clear that absent intent to create a 
right and a remedy "a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no 
matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute." 
Sandova~ 532 U.S. at 286-87. Justice Scalia was not persuaded to revert to the Court's ear-
lier, more favorable treatment of private causes of action; he said, "Having sworn off the 
habit of venturing beyond Congress's intent, we will not accept respondents' invitation to 
have one last drink." Id. at 289. 
2~ Sandova~ 532 U.S. at 289. 
237Id. (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981». 
238 See id. This reflects the message of the concurrence by Justice Scalia and Justice 
Kennedy in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349-50 (1997) (Scalia,j., joined by Kennedy, 
j., concurring). There, the Justices compared the position of the plaintiffs to third party 
beneficiaries to a contract. [d. (Scalia,j.,joined by Kennedy,j., concurring). The contract 
existed between the Federal Government and the entities that receive Title VI funds. [d. 
(Scalia,j., joined by Kennedy,j., concurring). The Justices suggested that third party plain-
tiffs, who are strangers to the contract, should not be able to sue to enforce the contract. 
See id. (Scalia,j.,joined by Kennedy,j., concurring). 
239 Sandova~ 532 U.S. at 291. 
240 Id. at 290; see supra notes 75 & 76 and accompanying text. 
241 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291. 
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been authorized by Congress. "242 The Court was clearly concerned 
with granting administrative agencies the power to create federal 
rights.243 In fact, the Court found that the enforcement mechanisms 
contemplated by the section 602 regulations "tend to contradict a 
congressional intent to create privately enforceable rights .... "244 
The dissent criticized the Court's decision to grant certiorari in 
the absence of conflict among the lower courts on the issue. 245 Justice 
Stevens noted that the Court's decision not only undercuts the "set-
tled expectations" of the federal courts, but of Congress as well.246 
The dissent had no difficulty identifying Congress' intent to create an 
enforceable right. 247 The text of Title VI itself "reveals Congress' in-
tent to provide ... agencies with sufficient authority to transform the 
statute's broad aspiration [of non-discrimination] into a social real-
ity. "248 Cognizant of the loss to plaintiffs, Justice Stevens raised the 
possibility that plaintiffs could proceed with their disparate impact 
claims by restyling them as § 1983 actions.249 As discussed in Part n.B 
242 [d. Emphasizing the limit on agency power, Justice Scalia wrote, "Agencies may play 
the sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer himself." [d. The Court is clearly worried 
about separation of powers concerns that would surface if agencies were allowed to create 
enforceable rights that Congress did not intend. See id. 
24~ See id. 
244 See id. at 290. The Court asserted that the "express provision of one method of en-
forcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others." [d. The 
Court relied upon its reasoning from cases involving § 1983, such as Middlesex County Sew-
erage Autlwrity v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I, 19-20 (1981), where it found that 
"some remedial schemes foreclose a private cause of action to enforce even those statutes 
that admittedly create substantive private rights." Sandova~ 532 U.S. at 290. The Court 
stopped short of finding that the remedial scheme provided by section 602 would preclude 
a private cause of action on Sea Clammers grounds because it was convinced that Congress 
did not intend to create a private right to enforce the regulations. See id. 
245 Sandova~ 532 U.S. at 317 (Stevens,J.,joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,lJ., dis-
senting). 
246 See id. at 302 n.9 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,lJ., dissenting) 
(Congress' actions reflect a clear understanding of a private right of action to enforce Title 
VI and its implementing regulations). 
247 See id. at 305-06 (Stevens,J.,joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,lJ., dissenting). 
248 [d. at 306 (Stevens,J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,lJ., dissenting). Stevens 
argued that the section 602 disparate-impact regulations are "inspired by, at the service of, 
and inseparably intertwined with § 601's antidiscrimination mandate." [d. at 307 (Stevens, 
J.,joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,lJ., dissenting). He concluded that "[i]fthe regula-
tions ... are either an authoritative construction of § 601's meaning or prophylactic rules 
necessary to actualize the goals enunciated in § 601, then it makes no sense to differenti-
ate between private actions to enforce § 601 and ... § 602." [d. at 310 (Stevens, J., joined 
by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,lJ., dissenting). 
249 [d. at 300 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,lJ., dissenting). Justice 
Stevens wrote that "[l]itigants who in the future wish to enforce Title VI regulations ... in 
all likelihood must only reference § 1983 to obtain relief .... " [d. (Stevens, J., joined by 
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supra, Congress has explicitly authorized a private right of action to 
sue for violations of federal rights under § 1983. 
B. The Lower Courts Respond 
Mter Sandoval was decided, lower federal courts reacted to the 
decision almost immediately.25O Sandoval made clear that a private 
right of action no long existed under section 602 of Title VI or corre-
sponding regulations.251 The following section will discuss how the 
federal courts have read Sandoval to affect the ability of plaintiffs to 
enforce their rights through the alternative mechanism of § 1983. 
Only a few federal courts have had the opportunity to consider the 
issue; the following sections will highlight the impact that Sandoval 
had on the Camden cement factory case.252 
1. Attempting to Keep the Door Open Through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
A recent environmental justice case, South Camden Citizens in Ac-
tion v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, provides a 
unique lens through which to examine the importance of a private 
right of action and a discriminatory impact standard to environ-
mental justice plaintiffs.25~ As discussed above, on April 19, 2001, the 
district court in Camden I granted plaintiffs an injunction based on its 
holding that an implied right of action existed to enforce EPA regula-
tions.254 Five days after the court filed its opinion and order, the Su-
preme Court yanked the rug from under the plaintiffs' feet. 
The district court was quick to amend its decision.255 This time, in 
Camden II, the court asked: Can the disparate-impact regulations 
Souter, Ginsburg Be Breyer,.rr., dissenting).Justice Stevens believed that the plaintiffs in the 
present case retained the option to obtain relief by drafting a new complaint that invokes 
§ 1983. Id. (Stevens,J.,joined by Souter, Ginsburg Be Breyer,.rr., dissenting). 
250 See generally Bonnie" v. Bush, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Lucero v. Detroit 
Pub. Sch., 160 F. Supp. 2d 767 (E.D. Mich. 2001); CamdenII, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.NJ. 
2001), orderrev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002) (mem.). 
251 532 U.S. at 293. 
252 See generally Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505. 
25' See supra Part II.A.2.c. 
254 See supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text. 
255 Less than one month after Sandoval was decided the district court issued a new 
opinion. See generally Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505. When the district court made its 
original ruling in Camden I, it recognized that the same legal question-whether a private 
right of action may be implied under Title VI-was currently pending before the Supreme 
Court. See Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 473 (D.NJ. 2001), up. modified & supplemented by 
145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.NJ. 2001), urder rev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 
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promulgated to enforce Title VI be enforced through an action 
rooted in 42 U.S.C. § 1983?256 The court first determined that the Su-
preme Courfs holding in Sandoval did not answer the question.257 
Therefore, it reasoned that Sandovafs limited holding did not fore-
close, as a threshold matter, the plaintiffs from bringing a claim for 
disparate-impact discrimination under § 1983.258 
The Camden II court defined the question as "whether, applying 
the three-factor test the Supreme Court articulated in Blessing v. Free-
stone, plaintiffs in this case can demonstrate that section 602, and 
specifically, the implementing regulations promulgated by EPA there-
under, give rise to a federal right enforceable under § 1983. "259 The 
court emphasized the difference between implying a private right of 
action and determining whether a plaintiff may enforce those rights 
under § 1983.260 The distinction between the implied right and the 
§ 1983 inquiries is important because it explains why courts may find 
that a statute which does not contain a private right of action none-
theless creates rights which are enforceable through § 1983.261 Prior 
to Sandova4 other courts had found that there could well be federal 
S. Ct. 2621 (2002) (mem.). The district court may have anticipated the fate of its original 
ruling. See id. 
256 Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 509. 
257See id. at 514-15,517,518. The court found that Sandoval only answered the narrow 
question of whether a private right of action existed to enforce the regulation. See id. 
Therefore, the court concluded that "the impact of the Supreme Court's holding in San-
dovalon this case is limited to its holding that § 602 of Title VI does not create an implied 
cause of action .... " ld. at 517. Sandoval's limited holding did not foreclose, as a threshold 
matter, plaintiffs "from bringing a claim for disparate impact discrimination ... under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983." ld. at 518. 
258 See id. 
259 ld. at 520. 
260 See id. The court took care to distinguish the Cort v. Ash "four-factor test" used to de-
termine whether an implied right of action exists under a statute, from the Blessing/Wilder 
test used to determine whether a plaintiff may assert a claim to enforce the same rights 
under § 1983. See id. at 520-21. The Cort test "'reflects a concern, grounded in separation 
of powers, that Congress rather than the courts control the availability of remedies .... '" 
ld. at 521 (quoting Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 n.9 (1990». Section 1983 
already provides an express remedy, so the Blessing! Wilder test is "concerned with whether 
the statute creates a federal right in favor of the plaintiff." Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 
521. 
261 ld. at 523. The court relied on a number of federal decisions for support of this 
proposition. See, e.g., Mallet v. Wis. Div. of Vocational Rehab., 130 F.3d 1245, 148-57 (7th 
Cir. 1997); Chan v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 96, 102-06 (2d Cir. 1993); Fay v. S. Colonie 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 1986); Keaukaha-Panaewa Comm. Ass'n v. Hawai-
ian Homes Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1467, 1470-71 (9th Cir. 1984); Santiago v. Hernandez, 53 F. 
Supp. 2d 264, 284 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Notably, the court relied on cases that all predate San-
doval, and it is not at all clear that these courts would hold the same today. 
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rights enforceable under § 1983 which are not enforceable by means 
of a private right of action under the statute creating them.262 
Although the Cart test and the Blessing/ Wilder § 1983 test are dis-
tinct, they share a common connection.263 Both require, as threshold 
matter, that the plaintiff is the intended beneficiary of a given stat-
ute.264 If the plaintiff cannot make this showing, then she does not 
have a federally enforceable right under § 1983, or a private right of 
action.265 If however, the plaintiff proves that she is the intended 
beneficiary, but fails on any other of the Cart factors, she may still suc-
ceed on a § 1983 action because the tests are otherwise unique.266 
The Camden II court accepted the plaintiffs contention that 
Wright v. City of Roanoke Housing & Redevelopment Authority stood for 
the "general proposition [that] ... agency regulations can create 
'rights' within the meaning of § 1983. "267 Noting that this interpreta-
tion was consistent with other Third Circuit holdings, the court con-
cluded that "valid federal regulations as well as federal statutes may 
create rights enforceable under § 1983. "268 The court deferred to Jus-
tice Stevens's logic in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown to find that EPA's regula-
tions have the force and effect of law, and therefore may create rights 
that are enforceable under § 1983.269 The court then considered, ap-
262 Boatowners & Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 716 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1983). 
26S Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d 386, 391 (9th Cir. 1996); Santiago, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 268. 
264 See Santiago, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 268. 
265 See Dumas, 90 F.3d at 391; Boatoumers, 716 F.2d at 673 (holding that satisfaction of 
the first Cortfactor is required to support a § 1983 action); Santiago, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 268. 
266 See Dumas, 90 F.3d at 391; Boatoumers, 716 F.2d at 673; Santiago, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 
268. 
267 See Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505, 526 (D.NJ. 2001), order rev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d 
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002) (mem.). The Supreme Court, in Wright, 
"held that the regulations created rights enforceable under § 1983 because they conferred 
benefits on tenants, which were 'sufficiently specific to qualify as enforceable rights'" and 
were not beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce. Id. at 527 (quoting Wright, 
479 U.S. at 432.) 
268 See id. at 527. The court also relied upon other circuit holdings, and inferred con-
gressional approval because "although [Congress] has amended the Civil Rights Act nu-
merous times ... it has never acted to correct, reverse, or otherwise change this consistent 
(judicial] interpretation of Congress' intent in enacting § 602." See id. at 532. 
269 Id. at 528-29. The court focused on the language of section 602 itself, in particular, 
the statute says that "' [e]ach Federal department and agency ... is authorized and directed to 
effectuate the provisions of section [601] ... by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of 
general applicability. '" Id. at 529 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-
1 (2000»; see supra notes 185-186 and accompanying text. 
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plying the three-part Blessing/Wilder test, whether EPA's regulations, 
in particular, actually create rights enforceable under § 1983.270 
The court asserted that '''there can be little doubt''' that Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act, and implementing regulations promulgated 
pursuant to section 602, were intended to benefit the class or persons 
to which plaintiffs belong, namely, persons of color.271 Furthermore, 
"the specific language of EPA's implementing regulations clearly re-
veals an intent to benefit individuals such as the [p]laintiffs."272 The 
court reviewed Title VI's legislative and regulatory history, finding 
that '''Congress wanted to avoid the use of federal resources to sup-
port discriminatory practices ... [and] it wanted to provide individual 
citizens effective protection against those practices.' "273 The court re-
jected the argument that section 602 and EPA's regulations are too 
broadly worded to invoke individual rights.274 
In addition, the court held that Title VI and EPA's regulations 
demonstrate that Congress intended to place mandatory obligations 
on the recipients of federal funding. 275 The plain language of Title VI 
and the regulations "succinctly set forth a congressional command ... 
which is wholly uncharacteristic of a mere suggestion or nudge. "276 
First, section 601 provides that "'no person shall be discriminated 
270 Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 529. The three relevant factors are: (1) whether the 
EPA regulations were intended to benefit the plaintiff; (2) whether the alleged right is 
judicially enforceable; and (3) "whether the provision allegedly creating the right is 
couched in mandatory or merely precatory terms." Id. 
271 Id. at 536. The court determined that the plaintiff's membership comes from a 
community that has a predominantly minority population, and therefore the plaintiffs 
"clearly belong to the class of persons Congress intended to benefit." Id. 
272Id. at 537. The language in the regulations refers to "individuals," and persons, and 
is "mandatory and clear." See id. at 536-37. Compare this to the analysis in Sandova~ which 
requires that such language be found in the statute itself. See 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) 
(holding that the search for congressional intent begins and ends with the text of the stat-
ute). 
273 Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 537. The district court said it must look to the entire 
statute and its policy objective to determine whether the statute creates a right. See id. 
Compare this approach with Sandovars singular focus on intent. See 532 U.S. at 287. (hold-
ing that legal context matters only to the extent that it clarifies the statutory text). 
274 Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 537. The court distinguished this case and Blessing v. 
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 330-31 (1997), where the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs 
"failed to allege with adequate specificity the rights which they claimed were being vio-
lated, and instead, had merely alleged a violation of a general provision of the statute." 
Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 538. Compared to the Blessing plaintiffs, these plaintiffs "have 
not merely requested 'substantial compliance' with a 'general provision,' but rather, have 
identified with precision both the regulator provisions upon which they base their claim 
... and the compliance they seek .... " Id. at 539. 
275 Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 542. 
276Id. (quoting Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 512 (1990». 
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against," and this is a "[c]ongressional mandate, not merely a 'prefer-
ence' or policy guidance.''277 Following section 601 in the statutory 
scheme, "[s]ection 602 'authorizes and directs' each federal agency to 
implement the mandate contained in [s]ection 601."278 EPA regula-
tions then incorporate the mandatory statutory language of sec-
tion 601.279 
Finally, the court determined that EPA's regulations are not so 
vague and amorphous that their enforcement would strain judicial 
competence.280 The court asserted that the judiciary, through a sub-
stantial body of case law, has demonstrated its capacity to enforce fed-
eral regulations prohibiting disparate impact.281 Furthermore, the 
federal courts have specifically demonstrated their ability to enforce 
the rights created by EPA's regulations on at least two occasions.282 
Satisfied that EPA's regulations passed the Blessing/Wilder test-
that they did indeed create an enforceable right-the court moved to 
the second step of the § 1983 inquiry, and concluded that Congress 
had not foreclosed the § 1983 remedy.283 EPA's regulatory enforce-
ment scheme simply does not qualify as "an 'elaborate enforcement 
provision' such as those which the Supreme Court considered in 
[Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. NationalJ Sea Clammers and Smith 
v. Robinson."284 EPA's limited regulatory enforcement power is not 
sufficient to meet the Supreme Court's high threshold that regula-
tions must meet before they demonstrate a congressional intent to 
foreclose recourse to § 1983.285 
Importantly, the court found that EPA's own interpretation of its 
regulations anticipates private actions.286 In fact, EPA's Draft Investiga-
tion Guidance "specifically addresses the possibility that individuals 
will seek judicial relief to vindicate their right to be free of discrimina-
277 Id. at 532. 
278Id. 
279 Id. The court asserted that the use of the term "shall" indicates a mandatory obliga-
tion. Id. The regulations use the terms "shall" and "shall not." 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.30, 7.35 
(2001). 
280 Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d. at 540. 
281Id. 
282 Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. City Envtl. Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 
2000); Chester Residents Concerned for Quality of Life v. Sief, 132 F.3d 925, 927 (3d Cir. 
1997), vacated as moot, 524 U.S. 915 (1998). 
283 Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 542-47. 
284Id. at 545; see supra notes 175-178. 
285 Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 546. 
286 See id. at 545-46. 
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tion .... "287 The court held that plaintiffs could enforce EPA's dispa-
rate-impact regulations under § 1983, and specifically stated that the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Sandoval did not affect its conclu-
sion.288 
2. Interpreting Sandoval to Preclude a Section 1983 Remedy: The 
Third Circuit Reverses 
On December 17, 2001, the Third Circuit overturned the district 
court's restyled opinion in Camden II, holding that EPA's regulations 
did not create a right enforceable via § 1983 because the alleged right 
did not appear explicitly in the statute.289 The Third Circuit con-
cluded that the district court's decision was erroneous because the 
plaintiffs did not advance a federal right.290 The decision is significant 
because the court changed the position that it had taken prior to San-
dova~ and shifted the balance of the circuit courts, leaving only the 
Sixth Circuit advocating that regulations may independently create 
§ 1983 rights.291 
287 Id. at 545; see EPA Title VI Guidance, supra note 27, at 39,673 (noting that EPA en-
dorses the concept of a private right of action). 
t88 See Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 546, 548. The Sandoval court did not address 
whether EPA's section 602 remedies "could overcome the strong presumption created in 
favor of enforceability under § 1983." Id. at 546. 
289 See grmeraUy Camden III, 274 F.3d 771 (3rd Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621 
(2002) (mem.). The court said that, post-SandovaJ. "it can hardly be argued reasonably that 
the right alleged to exist in the EPA's regulations, namely the right to be free of disparate 
impact discrimination ... , can be located in either section 601 or section 602 of Title VI." 
Id. at 788. 
290 Id. The court rejected the district court's reliance on Wright because "Wright dealt 
with an issue that differs from that presented in the district court and here." Id. at 782. 
Compared to the regulation in Wright, which "merely defined the specific right that Con-
gress already had conferred through the statute," the right asserted in Camden only ap-
pears in the regulation, not in the statute. See id. at 782-83. The Third Circuit stated that 
the district court's reliance on Wright was misplaced because "Wright does not hold that a 
regulation alone ... may create an enforceable federal right." Id. at 783. 
191 Other federal courts have considered the issue in light of Sandova~ but the Third 
Circuit is the only appellate court that has reversed its earlier position. A district court in 
the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a disparate impact claim brought pursuant to 
§ 1983 could survive the Supreme Court's decision in SandovaL See Bonnie v. Bush, 180 
F. Supp. 2d 1321,1341 (S.D. Fla. 2001). It found that the Supreme Court had determined 
that section 602 itself "does not create any 'rights<reating' language and focuses on the 
agencies rather than individuals," and that the regulations "impose[] distinct obligations 
beyond the specific content of the statute." Id. at 1344. It reasoned that to hold that these 
disparate-impact regulations, which are not enforceable through an implied private right 
of action, are enforceable through § 1983, "would be equivalent to holding that while 
Congress did not intend section 602 regulations to be enforceable against private entities, 
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The court declined to find that any of it's own precedent justified 
the district court's conclusion.292 Although the district court relied 
heavily on Powell v. Ridge, the Third Circuit warned that Powell "should 
not be overread. "293 In Powell, the majority said that the court "did not 
analyze the foundation issue that is central here, i.e., whether a regu-
lation in itself can create a enforceable right under section 1983," but 
rather, "we seemed simply to assume for section 1983 purposes that it 
could."294 This characterization of Powell is accurate. As discussed 
above, the court's § 1983 analysis in Powell was based on the conclu-
sion that plaintiffs enjoyed a private right of action to bring suit based 
on the section 602 regulations.295 That conclusion is no longer valid 
after Sandoval. 
The court turned to precedent from its sister courts and exam-
ined-as had the district court below-the contrasting positions be-
tween the Sixth Circuit and the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits.296 The 
court explicitly rejected the Sixth Circuit's approach and adopted the 
position that a federal regulation alone may not create a right that is 
not already found in the enforcing statute.297 
In light of Sandoval, the court determined that the right to be 
free from disparate-impact discrimination is not located in either sec-
tion 601 or section 602, and therefore, "the regulations, though 
assumedly valid, are not based on any federal right present in the 
statute. "298 The court found that EPA's regulations extend the scope 
of Title VI beyond what Congress contemplated and therefore, they 
are '''too far removed from [c]ongressional intent to constitute a fed-
eral right enforceable under § 1983."'299 The court recognized the 
broad and serious implications of its holding,300 but asserted that "if 
it intended them to be enforceable against state actors." Id. The Bonnie decision reflects 
the Third Circuit's rationale in denying the § 1983 remedy. 
292 Camden Ill, 274 F.3d at 783. 
293 Id. at 784. 
294 Id.; see Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 400-03 (3d. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 
1046 (1999). 
295 See supra notes 206-208 and accompanying text. 
296 See Camden III, 274 F.3d at 785-88. 
297 Id. at 790. 
298 See id. at 789-90. The court examined the Supreme Court's opinion in Sandoval to 
conclude that the Court found "no evidence of congressional intent to create new rights 
under section 602." Id. at 789. 
299 Id. (quoting Harris v.James, 127 F.3d 993,1009 (11th Cir. 1997». The court com-
pared the case to Smith and Harris, where the regulations did more than "define or flesh 
out the content of a specific right conferred upon the plaintiffs" by a statute. Id. at 790. 
-Seeid. 
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there is to be a private enforceable right under Title VI to be free 
from disparate-impact discrimination, Congress, and not an adminis-
trative agency or a court, must create this right. "301 
One judge filed a dissenting opinion, and criticized the majority 
for unnecessarily overreading Sandoval to overrule PoweU.302 Judge 
McKee wrote that the court in Powell did not simply assume, but explic-
itly held that a cause of action existed under § 1983.303 Judge McKee 
reasoned that by refuting defendant's arguments in Powell that § 1983 
does not allow a private cause of action to enforce the regulations, the 
court actually held that plaintiffs had a cause of action under 
§ 1983.304 The difficulty with Judge McKee's position is that the Third 
Circuit's § 1983 analysis in Powell was built upon its determination that 
the plaintiffs enjoyed an implied right of action.305 
Like the court below, Judge McKee emphasized that the question 
before the Supreme Court in Sandoval was narrow: Did section 602 
create a private cause of action to enforce Title VI's disparate-impact 
regulations?306 In contrast, the issue before the Third Circuit in Cam-
den Ill, is whether § 1983 provides an independent avenue to enforce 
disparate-impact regulations.307 Judge McKee asserts the court an-
swered the question affirmatively in Powel~ and that Sandoval did not 
overturn that holding.308 She argues that the majority wrongly inter-
prets the fact that the Supreme Court "did not find the requisite 
[c]ongressional intent for a private cause of action" to mean that 
"there can be no enforceable right under § 1983" because implying a 
right of action under a statute is an entirely different inquiry than de-
301Id. (emphasis added). 
m Camden III, 274 F.3d at 791 (3rd Cir. 2001) (McKee,]., dissenting). Judge McKee 
pointedly noted that the court overread Sandoval in spite of its own warning not to over-
read PoweU. Id. (McKee,]., dissenting). 
303 Id. at 794 (McKee,]., dissenting). 
304 See id. (McKee,]., dissenting). 'The majority'S attempt to suggest the contrary is 
tantamount to arguing that 'merely rejecting' the argument that 2 plus 2 does not equal 4 
does not at the same time establish that 2 plus 2 does equal 4." Id. (McKee,]., dissenting). 
305 See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 400-02 (3d. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1046 
(1999). The court simply imported its conclusion that plaintiffs had a right to an implied 
right of action to enforce the Department of Education's section 602 regulations and in-
serted it into the first step of it's § 1983 analysis. See id.; sUfrra notes 206-208, 295 and ac-
companying text. 
306 See Camden III, 274 F.3d. at 796 (McKee,]., dissenting). 
307Id. (McKee,]., dissenting). 
308 Id. (McKee,]., dissenting). The dissent emphasized "holding" because it criticizes 
the majority for treating dicta as binding. See id. (McKee,]., dissenting). 
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termining whether a right is enforceable under § 1983.309 The Su-
preme Court recently denied certiorari in the case.310 
IV. WHAT REMAINS AFrER SANDOVAL? 
Alexander v. Sandoval clearly holds that Title VI itself does not cre-
ate a right to be free from disparate-impact discrimination-it forbids 
only intentional discrimination. !Ill Therefore, if there is a federal right 
to be free from disparate-impact discrimination, that right is a purely 
regulatory right-because it originates in EPA's section 602 regula-
tions.312 The question that remains for environmental justice plain-
tiffs--and all other Title VI disparate impact plaintiffs--is whether 
they can enforce a purely regulatory right through § 1983. All but one 
federal circuit has said no.!ll!l 
How should litigants react to the Supreme Court's denial of cer-
tiorari in the appeal from the Third Circuit in the Camden cement 
factory case? Although the denial was certainly a victory for the de-
fendants, it should not be overread as an express affirmation of the 
Third Circuit's ruling. Mter all, the Supreme Court similarly denied 
certiorari when the Third Circuit had found that § 1983 could be used 
to bring a claim for violations of regulatory rights in Powell v. Ridge.314 
The Supreme Court may deny certiorari for a number of reasons.!ll5 
lI09 See id. (McKee,j., dissenting). The dissent, as did the court below, describes the dif-
ference between the Curt four-factor "implied right test" and the Blasing/Wilder § 1983 
enforceable right test. Further, it stressed that the separation of powers concerns that per-
vade implied right analyses are not present in § 1983 inquiries because § 1983 "'provides 
an alternative source of express congressional authorization of private suits.'" Id. (McKee, 
j., dissenting) (quoting Wilder v. Va. Hospital Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990». This 
argument is compelling when the § 1983 claim concerns a statutory right, but it seems that 
separation of powers concerns reemerge to weaken the argument when the claim con-
cerns a regulatory right. 
310 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002) 
(mem.), denying cert. to 274 F.3d 771 (3rd Cir. 2001). 
511 523 U.S. 275, 285-93 (2001); see supra Part IlIA. 
m 532 U.S. at 285-86; supra text accompanying note 233. 
m The Sixth Circuit appears to be the only federal circuit clinging to the position that 
administrative regulations have the force of law, and so may be privately enforced through 
a claim based on § 1983. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. 
314 189 F.3d. 387 (3d. Cir 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1047 (1999). 
315 See Kevin A. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Anarysis, 54 
OKLA. L. REv. 727 (2001). Each term the Court receives more than 5000 petitions, and 
chooses to hear approximately 100 of those on the merits. Id. at 729. The Court's decision 
to hear a case is influenced by a number of factors. See id. at 730. The decision may 
reflect the Court's (1) reluctance to act as an arbiter in disputes involving the 
allocation of power between the branches of the federal government, (2) will-
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This section will first review the policy arguments that have been ad-
vanced to support some version of a private action to enforce Title VI 
rights. Then, it will consider whether a § 1983 action can be main-
tained where a private right of action is not available in the post-
Sandoval era. 
A. The Policy Behind a Private Enforcement Action 
Advocates used similar policy arguments to promote the use of 
§ 1983 as they did to encourage courts to imply a private right of ac-
tion to enforce Title VI.316 Some of these arguments retain their force, 
and merit review, in spite of the Supreme Court's decision in Sando-
val. The Supreme Court has lately avoided considering the benefits of 
some form of a private action, making congressional intent its singu-
lar focus.317 In Sandoval, the Court clearly said that absent congres-
sional intent, even strong policy arguments cannot persuade it to im-
ply a right of action.318 The Court did not discredit the policy 
arguments because it did not even consider them.319 
Arguments in favor of some form of a private action emphasize 
the unique nature of a private remedy and the idea that a private ac-
tion would not interfere with EPA's enforcement of its regulations.32o 
A private action provides plaintiffs with a different remedy than they 
would receive through the administrative complaint process.321 The 
role of plaintiff may be more satisfying because a complainant may not 
directly participate in the administrative remedy process, and the 
complainant may only enjoy the indirect remedy of terminated fund-
ing to the recipient. 322 There may be intangible benefits to a private 
Id. 
157. 
ingness to make policy concerning civil rights and privacy rights rather than 
deferring to Congress or to the state legislatures, (3) willingness to take an ac-
tive role in "overseeing lower courts' interpretation and application of legal 
rules," and (4) willingness to become involved in national electoral politics. 
~16 See generally Private Cause of Action, supra note 49; Section 602 Regulations, supra note 
m See Sandova~ 532 U.S. at 286; supra text accompanying notes 234-238. 
!18 532 U.S. at 286-87. 
~19 Id. 
~20 See generally Private Cause of Action, supra note 49. 
321 Bradford Mank argues that the "administrative process does not guarantee individ-
ual participation nor does [sic] its remedies protect individual rights." Id. at 60. Therefore, 
he argues that an implied right of action is the only effective way to protect individual 
rights under Title VI. Id. at 60. 
~2l! Id. at 55. 
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action: compared to the environment justice complainant, the envi-
ronmentaljustice plaintiff may enjoy a greater sense of validation, and 
may generate more attention for her cause by directly participating in 
the litigation.323 One commentator has suggested that the enforce-
ment of Title VI may be a political tool, rather than a legal tool for 
environmental justice advocates because it "forces the public airing 
and recognition of disparate impacts and environmental injustice. "324 
A private action would not interfere with EPA's enforcement of 
its administrative sanctions because a private party may not request 
that a court terminate funding. 325 Therefore, the agency retains full 
control over the decision to terminate.326 Prior to Sandova~ EPA ar-
gued that its regulations "(1) do not preclude a private right of ac-
tion; (2) will not interfere with the agency's enforcement program; 
and (3) that this remedy will, in fact, advance the statute's purposes in 
light of the agency's limited resources."327 These private actions may 
serve an intermediate role in cases where the violations "are not per-
vasive enough to justify termination of the EPA's funding to the re-
cipient. "328 Further, by deputizing individuals as private attorneys gen-
eral, a private remedy would advance the statutes purposes in light of 
EPA's limited resources.329 
To compare, arguments raised against using § 1983 generally fall 
into four categories.330 First, there is concern that Congress has 
specifically designed the statutory right, sanction, and enforcement 
mechanism, and that adding a cause of action under § 1983 could 
produce more enforcement than Congress intended.331 Second, it is 
possible that courts lack specialized fact-finding and policymaking 
competence of the responsible agency.332 Third, decentralized courts 
323Id. 
324 Jeffrey M. Gaba, South Camden and Environmental Justice: Substance, Procedure and 
Politics, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) lI073 (Sept. 2001). 
325 Private Cause of Action, supra note 49, at 48. 
326 Id. at 55. 
327Id. at 56. Accordingly, the argument goes, EPA's interpretation should be respected 
because courts normally defer to an "agency's interpretation of its own regulations unless 
its interpretation is 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'" Id. at 55; see, 
e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 460-62 (1997); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens 
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 
410,414 (1945». 
328 Private Cause of Action, supra note 49, at 55. 
329 Id. at 47; supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
330 Sunstein, supra note 157, at 416. 
331 Id. 
332Id. at 417. 
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might produce inconsistency, and might treat similarly situated liti-
gants differently, as opposed to a centralized, responsible administra-
tive agency. !I!I!I Finally, it has been suggested that the use of § 1983 may 
diminish political control over the content of regulatory programs 
because courts are relatively immune from political pressures.!lM 
These arguments would have more force if EPA itself wasn't an advo-
cate of private rights of action. !I!IS The obvious problem for environ-
mental justice litigants, however, as the Supreme Court announced in 
Sandova~ absent intent, even the strongest policy arguments are un-
persuasive. 
B. The Fate of the Private Enforcement Action for Title VI 
Disparate-Impact Discrimination 
In spite of compelling arguments in favor of a private right of 
action, whether through an implied right or a § 1983 remedy, the Su-
preme Court's strong language in Sandova~ which focuses only on 
congressional intent, cannot be ignored. In Sandova~ the Supreme 
Court condensed the Cort four-factor test to the singular question of 
whether Congress intended to create a right of action.!I!l6 The Court 
dismissed any policy arguments in favor of an implied right in the ab-
sence of congressional intent.337 It is difficult to imagine that the Su-
preme Court would find, as the district court did in Camden II, that 
§ 1983 might be used to enforce a right that does not originate in the 
statute itself. Principles of separation of powers and the Court's focus 
on congressional intent suggest that § 1983 should not provide a rem-
edy for violations of purely regulatory rights.3!18 
Long before Sandova~ Professor George Brown argued, "section 
1983 should not be permitted to serve as an end run around difficult 
issues of statutory construction. If the real battleground is implied 
333Id. 
334 Id. at 418. 
3~ Supra notes 27, 286 & 287 and accompanying text (discussing EPA's endorsement 
of a private right of action). 
336 See 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). 
337Id. at 286-87. 
338 See Pettys, supra note 164, at 83. Pettys argues that the fundamental distinction be-
tween laws and regulations, and a review of the historical record "demonstrates that Con-
gress almost certainly did not intend to provide a remedy for violations of regulatory rights 
when it added the words 'and laws' to the Civil Rights Act of 1871." Id. at 99. "Congress 
would have used the word 'laws' to refer to regulations only if it wished to disregard [the] 
basic constitutional restraint" of the non-delegation doctrine. Id. 
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rights, the issues ought be debated there. "339 The plaintiffs lost the 
battle for an implied right of action in Sandoval. Professor Brown's 
comment suggests that Sandoval actually ended the § 1983 debate and 
eliminated a private cause of action to enforce Title VI's disparate-
impact regulations.340 Although there is a strong presumption in favor 
of a § 1983 remedy when a statutory right is violated,341 it is unlikely 
that the same will prove true for regulatory rights when the Supreme 
Court finally ends the debate. 
To determine whether a statutory right exists and is enforceable 
under § 1983, a court must find, as a threshold matter, that Congress 
intended to create the right.342 While it might be possible to simply 
substitute the word "agency" for the word "Congress" when the ques-
tion relates to a violation of a regulatory "right," 343 to do so would 
clearly steer the inquiry away from congressional intent, a factor that 
the Supreme Court has stated is "determinative. "344 Such action would 
essentially grant administrative agencies congressional authority. 
Prior to Sandova~ some courts were willing to allow plaintiffs to 
enforce rights through § 1983 even when they were unwilling to imply 
a private right of action to enforce those same rights.345 The Bless-
ing/ Wilder § 1983 test and the Cort "implied rights test" both present 
the threshold question: Does the provision intend to confer special 
benefits to the plaintiff?346 Prior to Sandova~ courts reasoned that so 
long as the plaintiff could demonstrate that she was intended to 
benefit, she could maintain a § 1983 action, even absent an implied 
right of action, because beyond this first question, the tests used were 
otherwise different.347 As Justice Scalia suggested in Thompson v. 
Thompson, and emphasized in Sandova~ however, the Supreme Court 
is singularly concerned with whether there is evidence that Congress 
intended to a right and a remedy.348 With respect to statutory § 1983 
claims, the Court has long said that congressional intent to provide 
339 Brown, supra note 163, at 63. 
340 See id. 
341 See supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text. 
342 Supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
343 See Pettys, supra note 164, at 83. 
344 See id. at 83. 
345 Supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
:546 See supra notes 263-266 and accompanying text. 
347 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). Absent evidence of this intent, a 
cause of action does not exist, and the judiciary may not create one. [d. at 28~7. 
348 See id. at 28~7; Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188-91 (1988); supra notes 
65-69, 235 and accompanying text. 
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the remedy is assumed.349 But the Supreme Court has said this in rela-
tion to statutory rights, and the right to be free of disparate-impact dis-
crimination, if it is a right at all, is a regulatory right. 
The environmental justice plaintiff does not enjoy the presump-
tion of a § 1983 remedy when the right she asserts is regulatory. The 
majority of the circuit courts to decide the issue have said that a 
purely regulatory right is not enforceable under § 1983-that the 
right must be rooted in the statute. The Third Circuit's analysis in 
Camden III reflected the Supreme Court's singular focus on congres-
sional intent. 350 The court did not examine the Blessing! Wilder factors 
because it found that Congress did not intend to create the particular 
right at issue.351 Before Sandova~ courts had required that the first 
Cort factor-intent to benefit the plaintiff-be met in order to sup-
port a § 1983 action. In Camden III, the court required that the Cort 
test-which has been reduced to the single factor of intent to create a 
right of action-be met in order to support a § 1983 action.352 There-
fore, in the Third Circuit, it is no longer possible for a plaintiff who is 
denied a private right of action to use § 1983 to enforce her regula-
tory rights. 
The Third Circuit's conclusion, though unfortunate for private 
plaintiffs, is the correct one. An implied right of action, or a right of 
action via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are both enforcement mechanisms. They 
are the vehicles that get plaintiffs to federal court. But these vehicles 
cannot operate without some fuel---namely, without a federal right to 
enforce. The Supreme Court plainly said that the plaintiffs in Sando-
val did not advance a federal right-their tank was empty. 
Justices Scalia and Kennedy aptly characterized the relationship 
between federal administrative agencies and Title VI fund recipients 
as contractual in Blessing v. Freestone.353 Private plaintiffs are, at best, 
third parties to this relationship.354 The text of section 602 makes no 
mention ofthem.355 When 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted, a third party 
beneficiary was considered a stranger to the contract and could not 
1149 Supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text. 
~50 See Camden III, 274 F.3d 771, 789-90 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621 
(2002) (mem.). 
~51 See id. at 785-89. 
352 See id. at 790. 
~5~ 520 U.S. 329, 349 (1997) (Scalia,].,joined by Kennedy,]., concurring). 
~54 See id. 
355 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 602,42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000); supra text accompa-
nying note 38. 
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sue upon it.356 In Sandova~ the Court was troubled by the absence of 
private plaintiffs from the statutory language, finding that the statute 
focused on the federal agencies and the fund recipients.357 It would 
seem that if Congress intended to benefit the private plaintiffs, to be-
stow upon them an enforceable right to be free from disparate-impact 
discrimination, then surely they should be mentioned in the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandoval to elimi-
nate an implied right of action to enforce the disparate-impact regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to Title VI also signaled the impossibility 
of using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as an enforcement mechanism. The current 
relationship between EPA's disparate-impact regulations and the ex-
press language of Title VI is too tenuous to support a private action. 
Agency objectives cannot supplant congressional intent. 
The termination of a private right of action to enforce disparate-
impact discrimination under Title VI will create a void that is not 
likely to be filled by administrative enforcement. Title VI empowers 
administrative agencies to terminate funding. But agencies, like EPA, 
cannot offer private plaintiffs what the courts have denied them. It 
remains to be seen whether the absence of a right of action will en-
courage EPA to be more responsive to administrative complaints. 
What can be said to minimize the loss to environmental justice advo-
cates who will likely lose their day in court? Activism must fill the void. 
Public awareness, scrutiny, and condemnation are powerful tools for 
the environmental justice movement. The courts are constrained in 
the absence of proof of intent, but the legislature may provide relief. 
Congress, should there be a private right of action? 
356 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 349-50. 
557 532 U.S. 275, 288-89 (2001). 
